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There are markets that do not require any active intervention - for example, the market for used cars. There are also those that are so complex that they cannot exist without careful attention and oversight from the government - for example, the market for human organs. Finally, there are markets in which state regulation manifests itself mainly at the moment when this market is just being created. First of all, we are talking about those cases when the state sells its property into private hands or grants rights to a certain type of activity.

There are three possible ways of privatization or transfer of rights. The government can hand them over to the player of the market, whom it chooses itself - economists disparagingly call this method of distribution of rights "beauty contests". As in real beauty contests, the decision in this case is made behind the scenes by a specially appointed commission. Of course, the commission can be competent and not corrupt, but this way of choosing the winner always causes mistrust among the public. The government may distribute property or licenses by lot. Finally, you can arrange an auction, the winner of which will receive what they want.

The same people sit in the government as elsewhere. Not surprisingly, "beauty contests" seem to them the most attractive way of privatization. In the autumn of 2006, the Russian State Commission on Radio Frequencies announced that the tender for allocation of frequencies for third-generation mobile communications would not be competitive. There will be no auction. The commission itself had to decide who would get the frequencies and how many players would be on the market. Maybe officials really know better who exactly is worthy of providing us with mobile communication services?

How to arrange an auction

A quarter of a century ago, auctions were rare in the distribution of public resources. The very word "auction" was associated with the sale of paintings and antiques, as well as the sale of property during bankruptcy. The only possible goal seemed to be to maximize the profits of the seller - so, in 195 AD, the Praetorian Guard sold the Roman Empire under the hammer to the one who offered the largest amount. When it was necessary to distribute state orders and licenses, this was done either in the course of "beauty contests" or by lot.

“Beauty contests” generate, if not corruption, then at least a sense of corruption both among those who did not get licenses and among the public. The distribution of licenses by lot gives firms that are not really interested in obtaining it the opportunity to earn money simply by registering to participate in the lottery. A company may not have the experience or resources to fulfill a government order, but if there is an opportunity to win by lot, and then simply cede the contract to those who can really take it on, why not try your luck?

Shortly after the US government began to distribute licenses for certain radio frequencies by lot, the number of applicants for them increased dozens of times, and this made the whole procedure meaningless. The chance that the firm that will actually use the license will win has become very small. And since the license is still being resold, it is more efficient to sell it immediately, rather than play it.

In addition, in the late 1970s, many governments had more properties for sale. Firstly, bad experience increased state intervention in the economy has shown that in many industries, markets are much more efficient than the government. In order to destroy inefficient monopolies, it was necessary not only to privatize them - it was necessary to create entire markets anew. Second, the booming telecommunications sector required the allocation of resources and the formation of markets.

The most acute topic of the last decade has been the distribution of licenses for the use of a new technology - the 3G spectrum of mobile communications. As with any new technology, no one can know in advance whether it will turn the whole world upside down or disappear in the coming years without a trace. Let's assume that third generation mobile communication is a super invention that will bring incredible profits to the lucky owner of the license. Excellent: as a result of the auction, these licenses will go to the most motivated companies that can correctly assess innovative trends.

Or maybe, on the contrary, 3G is a technology that has no future? In this case, the result of the auction will be low prices, which, without any experts, will confirm the verdict: no prospects. The main advantage of auctions is that citizens who participate in the process of distributing licenses in two roles - firstly, the seller of radio frequencies and licenses, and secondly, the consumer of the services of the companies that win them - do not need to worry about anything. Neither about whether the spectrum was allocated to the “right” companies, nor about how much the winners of the “beauty contest” paid officials. You only need to think about whether the auction is properly organized.

Experts versed in the intricacies of microeconomics developed a theory in the 1980s that seemed abstract at the time. In the next twenty years, the theory of auctions not only became a central topic of economic research - read the Nobel Lesson for which Roger Myerson and Eric Maskin received their prizes - but also made it possible to understand and organize real sales of all kinds of objects worth hundreds of billions of dollars.

An auction can be organized in different ways, depending on its purpose. If the seller wants to make the maximum profit - for example, we are talking about the sale of antiques, then you need to arrange it in one way. Another method is better suited if you need to stimulate the entry of new participants into the market. Such a problem may arise when selling any large firm. If only one participant participates in the auction - for example, the main competitor of the company in the market, it will be difficult for the owners to count on a high price.

A third auction format may be needed if there is concern that auction participants may collude. Depending on the rules of the auction, participants will have completely different opportunities for collusion. In open bargaining, it is quite easy for the “conspirators” to observe that none of the conspiring participants violates the agreements. So, you should arrange a closed auction, in which applications are submitted in envelopes and the winner pays the price that is written in his application: then it will be much more difficult to maintain collusion!

For different tasks need different formats of auctions. For most privatization auctions both in Russia and abroad, the main task was to conduct an auction in such a way that the object fell into the hands of someone who could extract from its use. highest profit, i.e. the most efficient owner. This is not at all the same as an auction, the main task of which is the profit of the seller.

In order to increase the efficiency of the auction, that is, to increase the likelihood that the object will go to the one who will derive the greatest profit from it, it is important that participants can see what their rivals are doing. For example, if several frequency licenses are sold at the same time, from which spectrum packages can be formed (this is how 3G auctions were conducted in Germany and Austria), then the tactics of each participant, for which licenses and up to what price to bargain, depends not only on its market strategy, but and how others are traded. The fact is that after the objects are sold, competition in the market will begin. A license for a spectrum band in some region is more expensive for us if our main competitor is actively traded for all other licenses there.


A quarter of a century ago, auctions were rare in the distribution of public resources. The very word "auction" was associated with the sale of paintings and antiques, as well as the sale of property during bankruptcy. The only possible goal seemed to be to maximize the profits of the seller - so, in 195 AD, the Praetorian Guard sold the Roman Empire under the hammer to the one who offered the largest amount. When it was necessary to distribute state orders and licenses, this was done either in the course of "beauty contests" or by lot.
“Beauty contests” generate, if not corruption, then at least a sense of corruption both among those who did not get licenses and among the public. The distribution of licenses by lot gives firms that are not really interested in obtaining it the opportunity to earn money simply by registering to participate in the lottery. A company may not have the experience or resources to fulfill a government order, but if there is an opportunity to win by lot, and then simply cede the contract to those who can really take it on, why not try your luck?
Shortly after the US government began to distribute licenses for certain radio frequencies by lot, the number of applicants for them increased dozens of times, and this made the whole procedure meaningless. The chance that the firm that will actually use the license will win has become very small. And since the license is still being resold, it is more efficient to sell it immediately, rather than play it.
In addition, in the late 1970s, many governments had more properties for sale. First, the sad experience of increased state intervention in the economy has shown that in many industries, markets are much more efficient than the government. In order to destroy inefficient monopolies, it was necessary not only to privatize them - it was necessary to create entire markets anew. Second, the booming telecommunications sector required the allocation of resources and the formation of markets.
The most acute topic of the last decade has been the distribution of licenses for the use of a new technology - the 3G spectrum of mobile communications. As with any new technology, no one can know in advance whether it will turn the whole world upside down or disappear in the coming years without a trace. Let's pretend that mobile connection the third generation is a super invention that will bring incredible profits to the lucky owner of the license. Excellent: as a result of the auction, these licenses will go to the most motivated companies that can correctly assess innovative trends.
Or maybe, on the contrary, 3G is a technology that has no future? In this case, the result of the auction will be low prices, which, without any experts, will confirm the verdict: no prospects. The main advantage of auctions is that citizens who participate in the process of distributing licenses in two roles - firstly, the seller of radio frequencies and licenses, and secondly, the consumer of the services of the companies that win them - do not need to worry about anything. Neither about whether the spectrum was allocated to the “right” companies, nor about how much the winners of the “beauty contest” paid officials. You only need to think about whether the auction is properly organized.
Experts versed in the intricacies of microeconomics developed a theory in the 1980s that seemed abstract at the time. In the next twenty years, the theory of auctions not only became a central topic of economic research - read the Nobel Lesson for which Roger Myerson and Eric Maskin received their prizes - but also made it possible to understand and organize real sales of all kinds of objects worth hundreds of billions of dollars.
An auction can be organized in different ways, depending on its purpose. If the seller wants to make the maximum profit - for example, we are talking about the sale of antiques, then you need to arrange it in one way. Another method is better suited if you need to stimulate the entry of new participants into the market. Such a problem may arise when selling a large company. If only one participant participates in the auction - for example, the main competitor of the company in the market, it will be difficult for the owners to count on a high price.
A third auction format may be needed if there is concern that auction participants may collude. Depending on the rules of the auction, participants will have completely different opportunities for collusion. In open bargaining, it is quite easy for the “conspirators” to observe that none of the conspiring participants violates the agreements. So, you should arrange a closed auction, in which applications are submitted in envelopes and the winner pays the price that is written in his application: then it will be much more difficult to maintain collusion!
Different tasks require different formats of auctions. For most privatization auctions both in Russia and abroad, the main task was to conduct an auction in such a way that the object fell into the hands of the one who could derive the greatest profit from its use, that is, the most efficient owner. This is not at all the same as an auction, the main task of which is the profit of the seller.
In order to increase the efficiency of the auction, that is, to increase the likelihood that the object will go to the one who will derive the greatest profit from it, it is important that participants can see what their rivals are doing. For example, if several frequency licenses are sold at the same time, from which spectrum packages can be formed (this is how 3G auctions were conducted in Germany and Austria), then the tactics of each participant, for which licenses and up to what price to bargain, depends not only on its market strategy, but and how others are traded. The fact is that after the objects are sold, competition in the market will begin. A license for a spectrum band in some region is more expensive for us if our main competitor is actively traded for all other licenses there.

If in anticipation of the conclusion of the transaction it is clear that the selling price will differ sharply from the usually applied and market prices, then it is better to make sure in advance. And one of the ways to justify the level of applied prices is to hold open auctions. For most companies, the term "open tender" is associated with government orders or purchases, or with bankruptcy. In addition, there is an opinion that this is too complicated a procedure.

In fact, any interested organization can easily organize a tender for its own purposes. Including for tax planning purposes, in order to drastically reduce the chances of tax authorities to accuse the company of underestimating the tax base for transactions with friendly companies. At the same time, in practice, the organizer of the auction often manages to conduct them in such a way that the regulatory authorities could not accuse him of fraud, and "foreign" companies could not unexpectedly win this competition.

The courts confirm that the price prevailing at the auction is always the market price.

The ability to conclude an agreement based on the results of the auction is contained in civil law. Any person can act as the organizer of the auction. It should only be the owner of what is put up for auction, or have other property rights to the object of the auction (clause 2). The purpose of such auctions is to identify the winner who has fulfilled the conditions of the auction. Participants compete with each other, as a result of fair competition, the market price of the contract is determined.

An example is . The company was accused of the fact that the transaction between related parties () was concluded at a lower price. However, the judges took into account that the choice of the counterparty was carried out on the basis of open auction. And with this method of concluding an agreement, the seller's will was not directed to the choice of a specific counterparty, since he was obliged to conclude an agreement with the winner of the auction.

Thus, the participation of the company in the auction and the offer of the lowest or highest transaction price in order to obtain an order or the right to conclude a contract is due to the presence of reasonable economic reasons and a business purpose. Such conclusions are supported by the courts (,).

It should also be noted that competitive basis bidding assumes, until proven otherwise by a court, the independence of the seller and the buyer. Consequently, the lack of intent of the participants to overstate or understate the price.

In this case, if the person who conducted the auction evades the conclusion of the contract, then the company that won the auction may judicial order force the other party to make a deal with him. In this case, the contract will be additionally protected by a court decision and, possibly, a writ of execution.

All this makes it impossible for the tax authorities to apply the norms to the prices prevailing at the auction. And in the future - new price control rules. In accordance with tax legislation, the price of a transaction between bona fide and independent partners is considered to be a market price.

The competitive form of selection, the possibility of bidders to protest their results already in themselves imply the impossibility of carrying out any kind of fraud with prices. The very economic nature of open trades lies in the fact that their organizer chooses for himself the most acceptable option for both the execution and the price of the future transaction.

In order for the tax authority to have the opportunity to apply the negative consequences in the form of recalculation of prices, it must first challenge the bidding itself. Prove in court that they are invalid. Practice shows that tax authorities are reluctant to apply to the courts with such requirements. The fact is that collecting a sufficient amount of evidence is very troublesome, time-consuming and in most cases does not bring the desired result. That is why there is practically no arbitration practice for appealing the results of bidding.

But in the case of obvious facts against the taxpayer, the tax authorities have a chance to win in court. Therefore, the attacks of inspectors are easier to prevent by competently organizing open auctions.

In practice, open tenders are often organized in a deliberately casual manner.

One of the forms of bidding is an auction (paragraph 1, paragraph 4). The winner is the person who offers the highest price. Therefore, when the goal of the auction organizer is the desire to sell a product, work, service as expensive as possible, then the auction must be carried out in this form.

Another option is to organize a competition. The winner of the tender is the one who offered the best conditions. Therefore, it is advisable to arrange this form of trading in order to conclude a deal at the lowest possible price.

However, what is the best conditions - the concept is subjective. This allows you to choose the winner of the competition in a fairly wide range. including those with high price offer. The decision is made by the tender commission, which is appointed in advance by the organizer of the auction (paragraph 2, clause 4).

For example, a company approves in advance the parameters of upcoming purchase transactions and in every possible way specifies its idea of ​​the most suitable conditions. But at the same time, most of these conditions do not apply to the qualitative parameters of the contract. As a result, the participants of the competition do not have a clear idea about the algorithm for determining the winner. Due to this, in the end, the “necessary” company will be able to win the competition.

Plus, this kind of auction organizers are often defiantly careless in their administrative duties. For example, confirmation that an application for participation has been received is provided to a potential participant only by an additional call. Such disorganization discourages serious companies from bidding.

Also, the owner of the auction object has the right to decide whether they will be open or closed (clause 1). The difference is that in the first case, any person can become a participant. In a closed auction and competition, only persons specially invited for this purpose participate.

However, such closeness is unlikely to help the seller or the buyer justify market prices. In this sense open form auction or competition is much more profitable. This will emphasize that the organization does not in any way prevent the participation of third-party companies, does not invite only friendly persons to participate. And even more so does not engage in their own selection.

The company's public notice requirement is often met only formally

The company must announce the forthcoming auction publicly. Paragraph 2 obliges to make a notice at least 30 days before they are held, and also describes a list of the minimum information that should be in such a notice. So, those wishing to attend the auction have the right to know where and when they will be held, in what form and what will be put up as the subject of the auction. In addition, the notice lists in advance the order of their conduct and registration of participation in the auction, the initial price and how the winner is determined.

There are no specific requirements on where and how to place an ad, so it should simply be available to an indefinite circle of people. Often any media is used for this: printed editions, radio, television. Accordingly, those companies that do not need to inform a wide range of people at all, go for various tricks when placing an advertisement for tenders.

For example, in order to ensure that there are no third-party companies among bidders, they place an advertisement about them in the local regional newspaper. Or they do it on the radio late at night. Or even place an ad on an inconspicuous pillar near the office or even in paper form - on the outer wall.

The Internet is also a way to convey information to an indefinite circle of people. This is convenient for the organizer of "friendly" auctions. After all, he can easily get a notarized confirmation that such an announcement was on one of the sites in the network at least 30 days before the tender. Then, on the same day, remove any mention of him from the Internet. This will minimize the circle of people who will have time to get acquainted with the conditions of the competition and prepare for it.

Note that such actions, although they do not directly contradict the law, can still become an argument in favor of the tax authorities in a possible litigation.

In addition, in order to exclude undesirable persons from participating in open tenders, it is often difficult for them to familiarize themselves with the terms of the tender. For example, by setting inconvenient working hours for an employee who demonstrates relevant documents to potential participants. Or they imitate the excitement when, when visiting the office of the organizer of the auction, the interested person cannot get acquainted with the terms of the tender in any way, due to the fact that other potential participants are studying them around the clock.

However, please note: in order for the auction or competition not to be declared invalid, it is advisable for the organizer to still take care of the minimum turnout. Because auctions cannot be held if only one company participates in them (clause 6). Thus, in practice, several friendly companies participate in such "scheme" auctions. At the same time, the organizer, as a rule, strives for them not to be interdependent.

The inability to check the reliability of the organizer will scare away unwanted applicants

If the organizer of an open auction is not interested in the appearance of "extra" participants, it makes no sense for him to prove his trustworthiness to them. After all, potential participants, most likely, as part of the standard exercise of due diligence, will want to familiarize themselves with the certificate of registration, an extract from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities, a power of attorney confirming the authority of the representatives of the auction organizer.

Of course, this information cannot be a commercial secret (Article 5 federal law dated July 29, 2004 No. 98-FZ “On Trade Secrets”), but the company is not obliged to provide them at the first request.

At the request of an interested person, the legislation obliges only to give an opportunity to get acquainted within a reasonable time, for example, with the charter of the company (clause 4, article 11 of the Federal Law of December 26, 1995 No. dated February 8, 1998 No. 14-FZ “On companies with limited liability"). But don't give out a copy.

Thus, the organizer of the auction has every right not to inform potential participants about himself at all, except for his name and minimal contact details. For example, numbers mobile phone. Not every company will dare to contact an unknown company in such conditions, especially if future contracts will require quite large financial investments.

Depending on the circumstances, both the maximum and the minimum amount of the deposit may be beneficial.

One of the distinguishing features of the auction is that participants make a deposit (clause 4). The size, terms and procedure are indicated in the notice of the auction. This is a kind of admission to participation. The deposit is returned to all participants if the auction did not take place, and if it did - to those who did not win. To the winner, the amount of the deposit can be credited towards the fulfillment of obligations.

The organizer of "friendly" auctions has two ways: either to establish a significant amount of the deposit in order to scare third parties from participating in the auction, or a minimal one in order to be able to refuse to conclude an agreement with an undesirable winner without any special losses. Both options have their pros and cons.

So, it is advisable to overestimate the amount of the deposit if the subject of the auction is the right to conclude a contract for the performance of works or services. That is, no valuable property is being sold at the auction, with which the group of companies does not plan to part. In this case, most likely, a significant part of third-party companies will not be able to simultaneously find a large amount of money to make a deposit. In addition, if there is no information about the reputation of the auction organizer, it is simply unsafe to transfer money to him.

But if, for example, a valuable property is put up for auction, it may be more profitable for the organizer of the auction to set a small amount of the deposit. After all, those who wish to apply can familiarize themselves with the title documents, technical documentation and consider the risk of losing the deposit due to the negligence of the organizer acceptable in comparison with the possible benefit of winning the auction.

With the minimum amount of the deposit, in the event of an unforeseen development of the situation, the organizer can quite painlessly avoid signing the contract with the winning person. The maximum that he will lose is the amount of the received deposit in double size. As for the compensation for losses caused by participation in the auction, in the part exceeding the amount of the deposit, it is unlikely that companies will present anything other than compensation for the amount of interest for the use of other people's money (). But this is also doubtful, since the costs of litigation are likely to cover the amount of possible compensation.

However, it is worth considering the risk that the winning company may legally force the organizer of the auction to conclude an agreement. Therefore, it is easier not to bring things to bidding at all if too many “unnecessary” organizations have registered for them.

After all, such auctions can be canceled altogether. But at the same time, the decision to cancel must be made no later than three days before the date of the auction and no later than thirty days before the day of the competition (clause 3).

If these deadlines have already passed, the organizer of the open auction can still cancel them, but at the same time he is already obliged to compensate the participants for the real damage they have suffered. And return the deposit to each participant (clause 4).

It is hard to imagine modern life without Internet. Which of our ancestors would have thought that in the future it would be possible to earn money in world wide web, without leaving home? On the this moment a huge number of people make money on the Internet, and this trend continues to grow and develop, turning into a kind of business. The possibility of additional earnings in order to increase capital pushes people to develop new projects that are different from existing ones and bring a stable income.

One of the widespread and effective projects that allow you to make money on the Internet is a business auction that has gained worldwide popularity and has become a source of income for millions of users.

The concept of an online auction

The essence of a business auction is that you can buy an item and resell it at a higher price. You can trade anything, from cosmetics to large household appliances.

In addition, you can organize your own business, for which you need an original business idea. An online auction is a generator of many ideas for entrepreneurship, allows you to order the production of certain products and be aware of what others have put in.

Unlike the classic Internet business, the essence of which is the purchase and sale of content, an online auction provides many more opportunities for aspiring entrepreneurs.

The online auction offers a wide range of real goods at prices well below market prices. Any user with Internet access can access it. Buying a product and then reselling it for more than favorable price at the same auction or real life, the ability to open an online store offering goods from anywhere in the world - all these operations bring constant and quite tangible profits, making the business auction the main source of income.

Business idea. What is it and what is it eaten with?

A business idea is an idea, a plan that underlies a process, the end result of which is to make a profit by satisfying a particular need of people. It is the receipt of profit as a result of the implementation of plans that distinguishes a business idea from other ideas.

In this case, the business idea is an online auction that allows you to earn money if you have entrepreneurial skills, a “trading streak”, knowledge of languages, and the ability to sell. This can be done in three ways:

  • ordinary resale of goods on domestic and foreign sites;
  • acting as an intermediary between the seller and the buyer;
  • providing consulting services.

Earnings at auction: reality or dreams?

Is it possible and how to earn good money at auctions on the Internet? After all, a virtual auction, which provides all the conditions for the growth of novice businessmen, does not guarantee quick and easy money.

On Internet auctions, only those who want and know how to carry out trading operations, speaks foreign languages ​​and has a market sense. The most popular auctions at the moment are ebay.com, avito.ru, molotok.ru.

The advantage of the auction is that it does not require a decent start-up capital and big investments, a business can be started with the purchase of several goods that are in great demand (fortunately, the range is huge), followed by resale on domestic, and even better, foreign sites. In this case, the user must:

  • be aware of market prices for your product in order to purchase it at a lower cost;
  • constantly research the market environment and competitors,
  • determine the most effective sales strategies;
  • know where to get hot commodity at wholesale prices;
  • understand the technical intricacies of the auction;
  • remember that a good business idea (an auction with a wide range of goods) is only half the success, the other half of which depends on skills and abilities.

Otherwise, there is a high risk of incurring losses without even starting to earn.

Consulting

Consulting services are another way to become a little richer, having with you a computer with Internet access and a wealth of knowledge acquired during your work at the same business auctions. unselfish help and valuable advice, advising start-up entrepreneurs on issues related to all the nuances of auction activities can bring quite tangible income.

Mediation

There is another interesting way to make money on the auction quickly and easily. This is a common mediation.
Acting at virtual auctions as an intermediary between the seller and the buyer of a particular product, you can also break a good jackpot.
The task of the intermediary is to advertise the goods and services of a certain company and attract potential buyers in order to receive commissions from each transaction. At the same time, the intermediary is not engaged in the search, purchase of goods and their delivery.

Thus, if you are so attracted to the business idea - an online auction, you need to decide who you will carry out trading activity: organizer, buyer, seller, intermediary or consultant. In addition, before you start trading, you need to study the market in detail, the mechanisms of sales and the features of the operation of business auctions. Definitely - the level of earnings on a virtual auction will directly depend on your activity, knowledge and skills.

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HOW TO ORGANIZE AUCTION

A quarter of a century ago, auctions were rare in the distribution of public resources. The very word "auction" was associated with the sale of paintings and antiques, as well as the sale of property during bankruptcy. The only possible goal seemed to be to maximize the profits of the seller - so, in 195 AD, the Praetorian Guard sold the Roman Empire under the hammer to the one who offered the largest amount. When it was necessary to distribute state orders and licenses, this was done either in the course of "beauty contests" or by lot.

“Beauty contests” generate, if not corruption, then at least a sense of corruption both among those who did not get licenses and among the public. The distribution of licenses by lot gives firms that are not really interested in obtaining it the opportunity to earn money simply by registering to participate in the lottery. A company may not have the experience or resources to fulfill a government order, but if there is an opportunity to win by lot, and then simply cede the contract to those who can really take it on, why not try your luck?

Shortly after the US government began to distribute licenses for certain radio frequencies by lot, the number of applicants for them increased dozens of times, and this made the whole procedure meaningless. The chance that the firm that will actually use the license will win has become very small. And since the license is still being resold, it is more efficient to sell it immediately, rather than play it.

In addition, in the late 1970s, many governments had more properties for sale. First, the sad experience of increased state intervention in the economy has shown that in many industries, markets are much more efficient than the government. In order to destroy inefficient monopolies, it was necessary not only to privatize them - it was necessary to create entire markets anew. Second, the booming telecommunications sector required the allocation of resources and the formation of markets.

The most acute topic of the last decade has been the distribution of licenses for the use of a new technology - the 3G spectrum of mobile communications. As with any new technology, no one can know in advance whether it will turn the whole world upside down or disappear in the coming years without a trace. Let's assume that third generation mobile communication is a super invention that will bring incredible profits to the lucky owner of the license. Excellent: as a result of the auction, these licenses will go to the most motivated companies that can correctly assess innovative trends.

Or maybe, on the contrary, 3G is a technology that has no future? In this case, the result of the auction will be low prices, which, without any experts, will confirm the verdict: no prospects. The main advantage of auctions is that citizens who participate in the process of distributing licenses in two roles - firstly, the seller of radio frequencies and licenses, and secondly, the consumer of the services of the companies that win them - do not need to worry about anything. Neither about whether the spectrum was allocated to the “right” companies, nor about how much the winners of the “beauty contest” paid officials. You only need to think about whether the auction is properly organized.

Experts versed in the intricacies of microeconomics developed a theory in the 1980s that seemed abstract at the time. In the next twenty years, the theory of auctions not only became a central topic of economic research - read the Nobel Lesson for which Roger Myerson and Eric Maskin received their prizes - but also made it possible to understand and organize real sales of all kinds of objects worth hundreds of billions of dollars.

An auction can be organized in different ways, depending on its purpose. If the seller wants to make the maximum profit - for example, we are talking about the sale of antiques, then you need to arrange it in one way. Another method is better suited if you need to stimulate the entry of new participants into the market. Such a problem may arise when selling a large company. If only one participant participates in the auction - for example, the main competitor of the company in the market, it will be difficult for the owners to count on a high price.

A third auction format may be needed if there is concern that auction participants may collude. Depending on the rules of the auction, participants will have completely different opportunities for collusion. In open bargaining, it is quite easy for the “conspirators” to observe that none of the conspiring participants violates the agreements. So, you should arrange a closed auction, in which applications are submitted in envelopes and the winner pays the price that is written in his application: then it will be much more difficult to maintain collusion!

Different tasks require different formats of auctions. For most privatization auctions both in Russia and abroad, the main task was to conduct an auction in such a way that the object fell into the hands of the one who could derive the greatest profit from its use, that is, the most efficient owner. This is not at all the same as an auction, the main task of which is the profit of the seller.

In order to increase the efficiency of the auction, that is, to increase the likelihood that the object will go to the one who will derive the greatest profit from it, it is important that participants can see what their rivals are doing. For example, if several frequency licenses are sold at the same time, from which spectrum packages can be formed (this is how 3G auctions were conducted in Germany and Austria), then the tactics of each participant, for which licenses and up to what price to bargain, depends not only on its market strategy, but and how others are traded. The fact is that after the objects are sold, competition in the market will begin. A license for a spectrum band in some region is more expensive for us if our main competitor is actively traded for all other licenses there.

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