About aircraft, and to be more precise - nuclear-powered cruise missiles, the general public spoke not so long ago. The fact that they exist, are being developed and tested, became known after a corresponding statement by the President of the Russian Federation this spring.
Meanwhile, the very idea of placing a nuclear power plant on an aircraft is not new - such machines were developed and even tested in the USSR, and a little more than ten years after the end of the Great Patriotic War.
In the 1950s of the last century in the USSR, unlike the United States, the creation of a bomber driven by atomic energy was considered not just as desirable, but as a vital task. This attitude was formed among the top leadership of the army and the military-industrial complex as a result of the realization of two circumstances.
Tu-95LAL
First, the enormous, overwhelming advantage of the United States in terms of the very possibility of an atomic bombing of the territory of a potential enemy. Operating from dozens of air bases in Europe, the Middle and Far East, US aircraft, even with a flight range of only 5-10 thousand km, could reach any point in the USSR and return back. Soviet bombers were forced to work from airfields on their own territory and for a similar raid on the United States they had to overcome 15-20 thousand km. There were no planes with such a range in the USSR at all.
The first Soviet strategic bombers M-4 and Tu-95 could "cover" only the very north of the United States and relatively small sections of both coasts. But even these machines in 1957, there were only 22. And the number American aircraft, capable of striking at the USSR, had reached 1800 by that time! Moreover, these were first-class bombers carrying atomic weapons B-52, B-36, B-47, and a couple of years later they were joined by supersonic B-58s.
A. N. Tupolev and I. F. Nezval
This situation could be corrected only by an aircraft with a nuclear engine, capable of providing an almost unlimited time spent in the air. As part of the creation of the Soviet atomic bomber at the end of 1957, along with other organizations, the A. N. Tupolev Design Bureau was involved in the implementation of this grandiose idea. He was entrusted with the creation of a special flying nuclear laboratory (LAL).
Specifically, this topic was supposed to deal with the branch of the Design Bureau of A.N. Tupolev in the small village of Tomilino near Moscow. In 1957, one of the oldest associates of the general designer, the future Hero, was appointed his chief. socialist labor Iosif Fomich Nezval.
Tomilinsky branch
Becoming the head of the branch, Nezval began by strengthening the design bureau. A group of designers consisting of about forty people moved to Tomilino.
With the appointment of Nezval as the head of the Tomilinsky branch, he essentially became the director of the enterprise and, according to his position, had to deal not only with the design bureau, but also with production, supply, personnel, life, construction and other issues. In a word, a lot of problems fell on him that he had not had to deal with before. But Nezval coped with it.
Atomic reactor
Middle part of LAL
Together with a special research institute, Nezval recalled, the OKB was instructed to install a low-power reactor on the aircraft in order to study its effect on the crew and electronic equipment. At this stage, the task of the design bureau was to develop the most compact placement on a special platform of both the object itself and all the systems necessary for its normal operation.
This platform, when assembled, was to be lifted inside the fuselage through a special hatch with the help of winches and fixed there with locks. The platform with the reactor had to be periodically inspected, and therefore it was required that it could freely fall to the ground.
Lifting platform with nuclear reactor
The production performance of the stand and the modification of the aircraft for the installation of a platform with a reactor were also entrusted to the Tomilinsky branch. For the construction, the middle part of the Tu-95 fuselage, which was available at the plant, was used, which, after the necessary modifications and strengthening of the structure, was installed on special supports with lodgements at a height corresponding to the parking position of the aircraft. This part of the work for the designers was familiar and did not present any difficulty.
As for the materials used to protect against radioactive radiation, there were a lot of new and unknown things here. In particular, completely new materials were used for biological protection, which designers had not dealt with before. Engineers had to work with materials such as polyethylene and boron carbide doped ceresin. To process them, it was necessary to develop a completely new technology.
The composition of these materials and the recipe for their manufacture were developed by the head of the laboratory of non-metals of the branch, A. S. Fainshtein, together with specialists from the Soviet chemical industry. These materials were tested at a special institute and were found suitable for use both on a bench installation and for an aircraft. They were supplied in the form of small cubes, which had to be connected to each other into large blocks, and then give them the desired configuration.
Docked parts of the fuselage LAL
When the stand was completely finished, the heads of the special institute came to see it. Having examined the stand in detail, they were amazed at the compactness with which the platform was made with the installation of the reactor and all equipment.
In 1958, the stand was completely finished and transported to one of the eastern airfields, where a place had already been allocated for its permanent residence. In 1959, its first launch took place. The results obtained turned out to be quite satisfactory and made it possible to carry out similar work on this topic on an airplane.
Flight tests
By the spring of 1961, “... the plane was standing at an airfield near Moscow,” recalled one of its creators, nuclear scientist N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, “and A. N. Tupolev arrived with Minister P. V. Dementyev to see on him. Tupolev explained the system for protecting a person from radiation: “... It is necessary that there is not the slightest gap, otherwise the neutrons will come out through it.” “So what?” the minister did not understand. And then Tupolev explained in a simple way: “On a frosty day you will go out onto the airfield, and your fly will be unbuttoned - everything will freeze!” The minister laughed - they say, now everything is clear with neutrons ... "
LAL in flight
From May to August 1961, 34 flights were made on the Tu-95LAL. The plane was flown by test pilots M. M. Nyukhtikov, E. A. Goryunov, M. A. Zhila and others, the engineer N. V. Lashkevich was the leader of the car. The head of the experiment, nuclear scientist N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, and operator V. Mordashev took part in the flight tests.
Tests of the Tu-95LAL showed the high efficiency of the applied nuclear plant and radiation protection system, but at the same time revealed its bulkiness, too much weight and the need for further improvement. And the main danger of a nuclear aircraft was recognized as the possibility of its accident and contamination of large spaces.
In addition, the cost of creating an aircraft with a nuclear power plant was estimated at 1 billion Soviet rubles, therefore, due to the high cost, funding for the work was denied.
The data obtained during the tests of the Tu-95LAL allowed the Design Bureau of A. N. Tupolev, together with related organizations, to develop a large-scale, two-decade program for the development of heavy combat aircraft with nuclear power plants. However, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Union.
It is easy to guess that the idea of an aircraft with a nuclear power plant came up not only with the American military and designers. In the Soviet Union, which took the first steps in the development of nuclear technology, similar proposals also appeared at the end of the forties. True, due to the general backlog in the projects of nuclear warheads, until a certain time, the USSR did not seriously deal with this issue. Nevertheless, over time, it became possible to allocate certain forces to create atomolets, besides, the country still needed such aircraft. Rather, the Soviet air force did not need nuclear aircraft as a class of equipment, but some new means of delivering nuclear weapons to the territory of a potential enemy.
The first domestic strategic bombers had insufficient range. So, after several years of work, the design team led by V.M. Myasishchev managed to raise the range of the 3M aircraft to 11-11.5 thousand kilometers. When using the in-flight refueling system, this figure increased. However, the strategic bombers of that time had many problems. In light of the increase in range, the greatest difficulty was to ensure timely refueling in the face of the risk of attack by enemy fighters. In the future, due to the development of air defense systems, the range problem escalated, and it was also necessary to start work on the creation of strategic-class supersonic aircraft.
By the end of the fifties, when these issues began to be considered, it became possible to conduct research on the topic of alternative power plants. One of the main options was nuclear power plants. In addition to providing a high range of flight, including supersonic, they promised great savings in financial terms. Under the conditions of that time, a flight to the maximum range of one regiment of strategic bombers with jet engines could "eat" several thousand tons of kerosene. Thus, all the costs of building a complex nuclear power plant were fully justified. However, Soviet engineers, like American ones, faced a number of problems inherent in such power plants.
Start
The first documentary evidence of the existence of the Soviet atomolet program dates back to 1952, when the director of the Institute of Physical Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the future academician A.P. Alexandrov sent I.V. Kurchatov a document that spoke of the fundamental possibility of creating a nuclear power plant for aircraft. The next three years were spent on a leisurely study of the theoretical aspects of the issue. Only in April 1955, the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree according to which the design bureaus of A.N. Tupolev, S.A. Lavochkin and V.M. Myasishchev were to begin developing a heavy aircraft with a nuclear power plant, and design organizations N.D. Kuznetsov and A.M. Lyulka was instructed to create engines for them. At this stage, the Soviet program to create aircraft with a nuclear power plant was divided into several projects that differed from each other in the type of aircraft itself. aircraft, engine diagram, etc.
Intercontinental cruise missile "Storm" - the grandmother of "Buran"
For example, OKB-301 (chief designer S.A. Lavochkin) was commissioned to create the 375 intercontinental cruise missile. The basis for this was to be the Burya rocket, also known under the designation "350". After a series of surveys, the appearance of the new 375 rocket was determined. In fact, it was still the same "Storm", but instead of a ramjet engine running on kerosene, it was proposed to install a small nuclear reactor on it. Passing through the channels inside the rocket, the outboard air had to come into contact with the reactor core and heat up. This simultaneously protected the reactor from overheating and provided sufficient thrust. It was also planned to change the layout of the original design due to the lack of need for fuel tanks. The development of the rocket itself was relatively simple, but, as is often the case, subcontractors failed. OKB-670 under the leadership of M.M. Bondaryuk for quite a long time could not cope with the creation of a ramjet nuclear engine for the product "375". As a result, the new cruise missile was not even built in metal. Shortly after Lavochkin's death in 1960, the theme of "375" along with the original "Storm" was closed. By this time, the design of a nuclear engine had moved off the ground, but before testing finished sample was still far away.
A more difficult task was given to the teams of V.M. Myasishchev and A.M. Cradles. They were supposed to make a strategic bomber with a nuclear power plant. The project of an aircraft with the index "60" or M-60 at first seemed simple. It was supposed to put nuclear turbojet engines on the M-50 bomber under development, which would not require additional time and effort. The M-60 was seriously considered a contender for the title of the first full-fledged atomolet not only in the USSR, but also in the world. Only a few months after the start of the project, it turned out that the construction of the "Product 60" was being postponed for at least a few years. In the project, it was necessary to solve a lot of specific issues that had simply not arisen before domestic aircraft manufacturers.
First of all, questions were raised by the protection of the crew. Of course, it would be possible to seat the pilots in a monolithic metal capsule. However, in this case, it was necessary to somehow provide an acceptable overview, as well as to make some kind of rescue systems. The second serious problem of the M-60 project concerned the safety of ground personnel. According to preliminary calculations, after just one flight, such a bomber should have been “fading” for a couple of months. The maintenance of such equipment required a new approach, for example, the creation of certain systems for remote work with nodes and aggregates. Finally, the 60 aircraft had to be made from new alloys: a design built in accordance with existing technologies would have an insufficient resource due to radiation and thermal loads. The chosen type of engine gave additional complexity to the project: an open-circuit turbojet.
All the technical problems associated with the characteristic features as a result forced the designers to completely rethink their first ideas. The airframe of the M-50 aircraft could not be used in conjunction with nuclear engines. This is how the updated look of the project "60" appeared. Now the atomolet looked like a mid-wing aircraft with a thin trapezoidal wing. A stabilizer of a similar shape was planned to be installed on the keel. In front of the fuselage, in front of the wing, air intakes of a semicircular section were placed. They walked along the fuselage along its entire length, skirting the cargo bay in the middle. Four open-cycle nuclear turbojet engines were placed in the very tail of the fuselage, assembling them in a 2x2 square package.
In the nose of the M-60, it was supposed to install a multi-layer capsule-cockpit. Maintaining the working pressure inside the cabin was carried out using a supply of liquefied air on board. Atmospheric air intake was quickly abandoned due to the possibility of radioactive particles entering the aircraft. The cabin capsule did not have any glazing to ensure the proper level of protection. The pilots had to monitor the situation through periscopes, television systems, and also with the help of radar station. To ensure takeoff and landing, it was planned to create a special automatic system. Interestingly, plans for an automatic control system almost led to a change in the status of the project. There was an idea to make the M-60 completely unmanned. However, as a result of disputes, the military insisted on creating a manned aircraft. Simultaneously with the M-60, a project for the M-60M flying boat was created. Such an atomolet did not need runways vulnerable to air strike, and also made it a little easier to ensure nuclear safety. From the original "60" aircraft, the flying boat differed in the location of the air intakes and in a different ski-type landing gear.
Preliminary calculations showed that with a takeoff weight of about 250 tons, the M-60 aircraft should have an engine thrust of 22-25 tons each. With such engines, a bomber at altitudes of about 20 kilometers could fly at a speed of about 3000 km / h. In the design bureau of A.M. Lyulka considered two main options for such turbojet nuclear engines. The coaxial scheme implied the placement of a nuclear reactor in the place where the combustion chamber is located in conventional turbojet engines. In this case, the motor shaft passed directly through the reactor structure, including through the core. The engine scheme, which received the code name "Rocker", was also considered. In this version of the engine, the reactor was moved away from the compressor and turbine shafts. The air from the air intake through a curved pipe reached the reactor and got to the turbine in the same way. In terms of the safety of the engine units, the “rocker arm” scheme was more profitable, but it lost to the coaxial engine in the simplicity of the design. As for the radioactive danger, in this aspect the schemes almost did not differ. The designers of OKB-23 worked out two options for the layout of the engines, taking into account their dimensions and design differences.
M-30
By the end of the development of the M-60 project, both the customer and the designers came to not very pleasant conclusions regarding the prospects for nuclear aircraft. Everyone recognized that, despite their advantages, nuclear engines have a number of serious drawbacks, both of a constructive and radiation nature. At the same time, the whole program rested on the creation of nuclear engines. Despite the difficulties with the creation of engines, Myasishchev convinced the military of the need for further continuation of research and design work. In the same time, new project implied the installation of nuclear engines of a closed type.
The new aircraft was named M-30. By the end of the fifties, the designers decided on its appearance. It was an aircraft made according to the "duck" scheme and equipped with two keels. In the middle of the fuselage of the aircraft there was a cargo compartment and a reactor, and in the tail section there were six closed-cycle nuclear turbojet engines. The power plant for the M-30 was developed at the design bureau of N.D. Kuznetsov and meant the transfer of heat from the reactor to the air in the engine through the coolant. Lithium and sodium in the liquid state were considered as the latter. In addition, the design of closed-type nuclear turbojets made it possible to use ordinary kerosene in them, which promised to simplify the operation of the aircraft. characteristic feature new closed-circuit engine was the lack of need for a dense arrangement of engines. Thanks to the use of a pipeline with a coolant, the reactor could be reliably closed with insulating structures. Finally, the engine did not release radioactive material into the atmosphere, which made it possible to simplify the cockpit ventilation system.
In general, the use of a closed-type engine turned out to be more profitable compared to the previous version. First of all, the benefit had a weight "embodiment". Of the aircraft's 170 tons of takeoff weight, 30 were for the engines and heat transfer system, and 38 for protecting the reactor and crew. At the same time, the payload of the M-30 was 25 tons. The calculated flight characteristics of the M-30 differed slightly from those of the M-60. The first flight of the new nuclear-powered bomber was scheduled for 1966. However, a few years before that, all projects with the letter "M" were curtailed. First, OKB-23 was involved in work on other topics, and later it was reorganized. According to some sources, the engineers of this organization did not even have time to deploy a full-fledged design of the M-30 bomber.
Tu-95LAL
Simultaneously with OKB-23, Tupolev's designers worked on their project. Their assignment was a little more simple: to modify the existing Tu-95 for use with a nuclear power plant. Until the end of the 55th year, engineers were working on various issues related to the design of the aircraft, a specific power plant, etc. Around the same time, Soviet intelligence officers who worked in the United States began to send the first information about similar American projects. Soviet scientists became aware of the first flights of an American flying laboratory with nuclear reactor on board. However, the information available was far from complete. Therefore, our engineers had to brainstorm, as a result of which they came to the conclusion that they could simply “remove” the reactor, without using it as an energy source. As a matter of fact, that is exactly what happened. In addition, our scientists considered the purpose of test flights to be the measurement of various parameters directly or indirectly related to the effect of radiation on the aircraft structure and its crew. Shortly thereafter, Tupolev and Kurchatov agreed to conduct similar tests.
Tu-95 LAL, the photo shows a convex lantern above the reactor
The development of a flying laboratory based on the Tu-95 was carried out in an interesting way. OKB-156 designers and nuclear scientists regularly held seminars, during which the latter told the first about all the nuances of nuclear power plants, their protection and design features. Thus, aircraft engineers received all the necessary information, without which they could not make an atomolet. According to the recollections of the participants of those events, one of the most memorable moments was the discussion of the protection of reactors. As the nuclear scientists said, the finished reactor with all the protection systems is the size of a small house. The layout department of the design bureau became interested in this problem and soon developed a new reactor layout in which all units had an acceptable size and at the same time an adequate level of protection was provided. With an annotation in the style of "they don't carry houses on planes," this scheme was demonstrated to physicists. The new layout of the reactor was carefully tested, approved by nuclear scientists and accepted as the basis for the power plant for the new flying laboratory.
The main goal of the Tu-95LAL project (flying nuclear laboratory) was to check the level of protection of the onboard reactor and work out all the nuances of the design associated with it. Already at the design stage, an interesting approach was applied. Unlike the Myasishchev team, the Tupolev team decided to protect the crew only from the most dangerous directions. The main elements of radiation protection were placed behind the cabin, and the remaining areas were covered by less serious packages of various materials. In addition, the idea of a compact reactor protection was further developed, which, with some changes, was included in the Tu-95LAL project. At the first flying laboratory, it was planned to test the applied ideas for protecting the units and the crew, and use the data obtained for the further development of the project and, if necessary, design changes.
By 1958, the first test reactor had been built. It was placed in a dimensional simulator of the Tu-95 aircraft fuselage. Soon, the test bench, together with the reactor, was sent to the test site near Semipalatinsk, where in 1959 work reached the trial run of the reactor. By the end of the year, it was brought to its design capacity, and the protection and control systems were finalized. Simultaneously with the testing of the first reactor, the assembly of the second, intended for a flying laboratory, was underway, as well as the conversion of a serial bomber for use in the experiment.
The serial Tu-95M No. 7800408, when converted into a flying laboratory, lost all weapons, including the equipment associated with it. Immediately behind the cockpit, a five-centimeter lead plate and a package of polymer materials 15 cm thick were installed. Sensors were installed in the nose, tail and middle part of the fuselage, as well as on the wings, monitoring the level of radiation. An experimental reactor was placed in the rear cargo compartment. Its protection to some extent resembled that used in the cockpit, but the reactor core was placed inside a round protective casing. Since the reactor was used only as a radiation source, it had to be equipped with a cooling system. Distilled water circulated in close proximity to the nuclear fuel and cooled it. Further, the heat was transferred to the water of the second circuit, which dissipated the received energy with the help of a radiator. The latter was blown by the oncoming stream. The outer casing of the reactor as a whole fit into the contours of the fuselage of the former bomber, however, holes had to be cut through the top and sides in the skin and covered with fairings. In addition, a radiator intake device was brought to the lower surface of the fuselage.
For experimental purposes, the protective casing of the reactor was equipped with several windows placed in different parts of it. The opening and closing of one or another window occurred on command from the control panel in the cockpit. With the help of these windows, it was possible to increase the radiation in a certain direction and measure the level of its reflection from the environment. All assembly work was completed by the beginning of 1961.
In May 1961, the Tu-95LAL took to the air for the first time. Over the next three months, 34 flights were made with a "cold" and working reactor. All experiments and measurements proved the fundamental possibility of placing a nuclear reactor on board an aircraft. At the same time, several design problems were discovered, which were planned to be corrected in the future. And yet, the accident of such an atomolet, despite all the means of protection, threatened with serious environmental consequences. Fortunately, all experimental flights of the Tu-95LAL went off without a hitch.
Reactor dismantling from Tu-95 LAL aircraft
In August 61, the reactor was removed from the flying laboratory, and the aircraft itself was parked at the airfield at the training ground. A few years later, the Tu-95LAL without a reactor was transferred to Irkutsk, where it was later decommissioned and cut into scrap metal. According to some sources, the bureaucratic affairs of the Perestroika era became the reason for cutting the aircraft. During this period, the Tu-95LAL flying laboratory was allegedly considered a combat aircraft and treated in accordance with international agreements.
Projects "119" and "120"
According to the test results of the Tu-95LAL aircraft, nuclear scientists finalized the aircraft reactor, and Tupolev's design bureau began work on the creation of a new atomic aircraft. Unlike the previous experimental aircraft, the new one was proposed to be based on the passenger Tu-114 with a slightly larger fuselage. The Tu-119 aircraft was supposed to be equipped with two NK-12M kerosene turboprop engines and two NK-14A, created on their basis. The "fourteenth" engines, in addition to the standard combustion chamber, were equipped with a heat exchanger for operating in the air heating mode from the reactor, in a closed circuit. The layout of the Tu-119 to a certain extent resembled the placement of the units on the Tu-95LAL, but this time the aircraft was provided with pipelines for the coolant connecting the reactor and two engines.
The creation of turboprop engines with heat exchangers to transfer heat from reactors did not proceed quickly due to constant delays and problems. As a result, the Tu-119 did not receive new NK-14A engines. Plans for the creation of two flying laboratories with two nuclear engines each were not implemented. The failure with the first experimental aircraft "119" led to the failure of further plans, which implied the construction of an aircraft with four NK-14A at once.
The closure of the Tu-119 project also buried all plans for the 120 project. This swept-wing high-wing aircraft was supposed to be equipped with four engines, and carry anti-submarine equipment and weapons in the fuselage. Such an anti-submarine aircraft, according to calculations, could patrol for two days. The range and duration of the flight were actually limited only by the capabilities of the crew. Also, in the course of the 120 project, the possibility of creating a strategic bomber like the Tu-95 or 3M, but with six engines and a supersonic strike aircraft with the possibility of low-altitude flight, was studied. Due to problems with the NK-14A engines, all these projects were closed.
Nuclear "Antey"
Despite the unsuccessful completion of the 119 project, the military did not lose their desire to get an ultra-long anti-submarine aircraft with a large payload. In 1965, it was decided to take the An-22 Antey transport aircraft as the basis for it. Inside the wide fuselage of this aircraft, it was possible to place a reactor, a whole set of weapons, and operator jobs along with special equipment. As engines for the AN-22PLO aircraft, the NK-14A was again offered, work on which gradually began to move forward. According to calculations, the duration of the patrol of such an aircraft could reach 50 (fifty!) Hours. Takeoff and landing were carried out using kerosene, flight at cruising speed - on the heat released by the reactor. It is worth noting that 50 hours was only the recommended flight duration. In practice, such an anti-submarine aircraft could fly more until the crew lost the ability to effective work or until technical problems start. 50 hours in this case was a kind of warranty period during which the An-22PLO would not have had any problems.
Employees of the design bureau O.K. Antonov wisely disposed of the internal volumes of the Antey cargo compartment. Immediately behind the cockpit, a compartment for the target equipment and its operators was placed, behind it, amenity rooms for rest were provided, then a compartment for the rescue boat was “inserted” in case of an emergency landing on the water, and in the back cargo cabin placed the reactor with protection. At the same time, there was almost no room for weapons. Mines and torpedoes were proposed to be placed in enlarged chassis fairings. However, after preliminary work on the layout, a serious problem was revealed: the finished aircraft turned out to be too heavy. Nuclear engines NK-14A with a capacity of 8900 hp simply could not provide the required flight characteristics. This problem was solved by changing the design of the reactor protection. After refinement, its mass was significantly reduced, but the level of protection not only did not suffer, but even increased slightly. In 1970, the An-22 No. 01-06 was equipped with a point source of radiation with protection made in accordance with the later versions of the An-22PLO project. During ten test flights, it turned out that the new protection option fully justified itself, and not only in the weight aspect.
A full-fledged reactor was created under the leadership of A.P. Alexandrova. Unlike previous designs, the new aviation reactor was equipped with its own control systems, automatic protection, etc. To control the reaction, the new nuclear unit received an updated carbon rod control system. In case of an emergency, a special mechanism was provided that literally fired these rods into the reactor core. The nuclear power plant was mounted on aircraft No. 01-07.
The test program, codenamed "Aist", began in the same 1970 year. During the tests, 23 flights were carried out, almost all passed without complaints. The only technical problem concerned the connector of one of the equipment blocks. Due to a detached contact during one of the flights, it was not possible to turn on the reactor. A small repair "in the field" made it possible to continue full-fledged flights. After the 23rd flight, the An-22 tests with a working nuclear reactor on board were recognized as successful, the prototype aircraft was parked and research continued. design work according to the An-22PLO project. However, this time too, design flaws and the complexity of the nuclear power plant led to the closure of the project. The ultra-long anti-submarine aircraft turned out to be super expensive and super complex. In the mid-seventies, the An-22PLO project was closed.
After the cessation of work on the anti-submarine version of the Antey, other options for the use of atomolets were considered for some time. For example, it was seriously proposed to make a loitering carrier of strategic missiles on the basis of the An-22 or a similar vehicle. Over time, there were also proposals to increase the level of security. The main thing was the equipment of the reactor own system parachute rescue. Thus, in the event of an accident or serious damage to the aircraft, its power plant could independently make a soft landing. The area of her landing was not threatened with infection. However, these proposals have not received further development. Due to past failures, the main customer, represented by the Ministry of Defense, lost interest in aircraft. The seemingly limitless prospects of this class of technology could not resist the pressure of technical problems and, as a result, did not lead to the expected result. In recent years, from time to time there have been reports of new attempts to create aircraft with a nuclear power plant, but even half a century after the flights of the Tu-95LAL flying laboratory, not a single aircraft flew using the energy of uranium fission.
According to the websites:
http://vfk1.narod.ru/
http://testpilot.ru/
http://airwar.ru/
http://nkj.ru/
http://laspace.ru/
http://airbase.ru/
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M-60 strategic atomic bomber project
Let's start with the fact that in the 1950s. in the USSR, unlike the United States, the creation of an atomic bomber was perceived not just as desirable, even very, but as a vital task. This attitude was formed among the top leadership of the army and the military-industrial complex as a result of the realization of two circumstances. Firstly, the huge, overwhelming advantage of the States in terms of the very possibility of atomic bombing of the territory of a potential enemy. Operating from dozens of air bases in Europe, the Middle and Far East, US aircraft, even with a flight range of only 5-10 thousand km, could reach any point in the USSR and return back. Soviet bombers were forced to work from airfields on their own territory, and for a similar raid on the United States they had to overcome 15-20 thousand km. There were no planes with such a range in the USSR at all. The first Soviet strategic bombers M-4 and Tu-95 could "cover" only the very north of the United States and relatively small sections of both coasts. But even these machines in 1957, there were only 22. And the number of American aircraft capable of attacking the USSR had reached 1800 by that time! Moreover, these were first-class bombers carrying atomic weapons B-52, B-36, B-47, and a couple of years later they were joined by supersonic B-58s.
The Tupolev flying laboratory, built on the basis of the Tu-95 as part of the 119 project, turned out to be in fact the only aircraft on which the idea of a nuclear power plant was somehow implemented in metal.
Secondly, the task of creating a jet bomber of the required flight range with a conventional power plant in the 1950s. seemed overwhelmingly difficult. Moreover, supersonic, the need for which was dictated by the rapid development of air defense systems. The flights of the USSR's first supersonic strategic carrier M-50 showed that with a load of 3-5 tons, even with two refuelings in the air, its range can hardly reach 15,000 km. But no one could answer how to refuel at supersonic speed, and besides, over enemy territory. The need for refueling significantly reduced the likelihood of completing a combat mission, and in addition, such a flight required a huge amount of fuel - in the amount of more than 500 tons for refueling and refueling aircraft. That is, in just one sortie, a regiment of bombers could use up more than 10,000 tons of kerosene! Even the simple accumulation of such reserves of fuel grew into a huge problem, not to mention the safe storage and protection from possible air strikes.
At the same time, the country had a powerful research and production base for solving various problems of using nuclear energy. It took its origin from Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences, organized under the leadership of I.V. Kurchatov in the midst of the Great patriotic war- in April 1943. At first, the main task of nuclear scientists was to create a uranium bomb, but then an active search began for other possibilities for using a new type of energy. In March 1947 - only a year later than in the USA - in the USSR for the first time at the state level (at a meeting of the Scientific and Technical Council of the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers) the problem of using the heat of nuclear reactions in power plants was raised. The Council decided to start systematic research in this direction with the aim of developing the scientific basis for obtaining electricity using nuclear fission, as well as propulsion of ships, submarines and aircraft.
The future academician A.P. Aleksandrov became the scientific supervisor of the work. Several variants of nuclear aviation power plants were considered: open and closed cycle based on ramjet, turbojet and turboprop engines. Various types of reactors were developed: with air and with intermediate liquid metal cooling, on thermal and fast neutrons, etc. Coolants acceptable for use in aviation and methods for protecting the crew and onboard equipment from exposure to radiation were studied. In June 1952, Alexandrov reported to Kurchatov: "... Our knowledge in the field of nuclear reactors allows us to raise the question of creating nuclear-powered engines used for heavy aircraft in the coming years ...".
However, it took another three years for the idea to make its way. During this time, the first M-4 and Tu-95 managed to take to the skies, the first in the world began to work in the Moscow region nuclear power plant, the construction of the first Soviet nuclear submarine began. Our agents in the United States began to transmit information about the large-scale work being carried out there to create an atomic bomber. These data were perceived as confirmation of the promise of a new type of energy for aviation. Finally, on August 12, 1955, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1561-868 was issued, ordering a number of enterprises aviation industry to begin work on the atomic subject. In particular, OKB-156 of A.N. Tupolev, OKB-23 of V.M. Myasishchev and OKB-301 of S.A. Kuznetsov and OKB-165 A.M. Lyulka - the development of such control systems.
The most technically simple task was assigned to OKB-301, headed by S.A. Lavochkin - to develop an experimental cruise missile "375" with a nuclear ramjet engine designed by M.M. Bondaryuk OKB-670. The place of a conventional combustion chamber in this engine was occupied by an open-cycle reactor - air flowed directly through the core. The design of the rocket airframe was based on the developments on the intercontinental cruise missile "350" with a conventional ramjet. Despite its relative simplicity, the theme of "375" did not receive any significant development, and the death of S.A. Lavochkin in June 1960 completely put an end to these works.
Atomic turbojet engine of the "rocker arm" scheme
Atomic turbojet engine "coaxial" scheme
One of the possible layouts of Myasishchev's nuclear seaplane
Nuclear flying laboratory project
based on M-50
M-30 strategic atomic bomber project
The Myasishchev team, then engaged in the creation of the M-50, was ordered to carry out a preliminary project of a supersonic bomber "with special engines of the chief designer A.M. Lyulka." In the Design Bureau, the theme received the index "60", Yu.N. Trufanov was appointed the lead designer for it. Because in the most in general terms the solution to the problem was seen in the simple equipping of the M-50 with nuclear-powered engines, moreover, operating on an open cycle (for reasons of simplicity), it was believed that the M-60 would become the first nuclear aircraft in the USSR. However, by the middle of 1956, it became clear that the problem posed could not be solved so simply. It turned out that the machine with the new control system has a number of specific features that aircraft designers have never encountered before. The novelty of the problems that arose was so great that no one in the Design Bureau, and indeed in the entire mighty Soviet aircraft industry, had no idea how to approach their solution.
The first problem was the protection of people from radioactive radiation. What should she be? How much should you weigh? How to ensure the normal functioning of the crew enclosed in an impenetrable thick-walled capsule, incl. review from workplaces and emergency escape? The second problem is a sharp deterioration in the properties of familiar structural materials caused by powerful radiation and heat flows emanating from the reactor. Hence the need to create new materials. The third is the need to develop a completely new technology the operation of nuclear aircraft and the construction of corresponding air bases with numerous underground facilities. After all, it turned out that after stopping the open cycle engine, not a single person will be able to approach it for another 2-3 months! This means that there is a need for remote ground maintenance of the aircraft and engine. And, of course, safety issues - in the broadest sense, especially in the event of an accident of such an aircraft.
Awareness of these and many other problems of stone on stone did not leave the original idea to use the M-50 glider. The designers focused on finding a new layout in which the above problems seemed to be solvable. At the same time, the main criterion for choosing the location of the nuclear power plant on the aircraft was recognized as its maximum distance from the crew. Accordingly, it was developed preliminary design M-60, on which four nuclear turbojet engines were located in the rear fuselage in pairs in "two floors", forming a single nuclear compartment. The aircraft had a mid-wing scheme with a thin cantilever trapezoidal wing and the same horizontal tail located at the top of the keel. Rocket and bomb weapons were planned to be placed on the internal suspension. The length of the aircraft was to be about 66 m, the takeoff weight was to exceed 250 tons, and the cruising speed of flight was to be 3000 km/h at an altitude of 18000-20000 m.
The crew was supposed to be placed in a blind capsule with powerful multi-layer protection made of special materials. The radioactivity of atmospheric air excluded the possibility of using it for pressurization of the cabin and breathing. For these purposes, it was necessary to use an oxygen-nitrogen mixture obtained in special gasifiers by evaporating liquid gases on board. The lack of visual visibility had to be compensated by periscopes, television and radar screens, as well as the installation of a fully automatic aircraft control system. The latter was supposed to provide all stages of the flight, including takeoff and landing, access to the target, etc. This logically led to the idea of an unmanned strategic bomber. However, the Air Force insisted on a manned version as more reliable and flexible in use.
Ground Reactor Test Bench
Nuclear turbojet engines for the M-60 were supposed to develop a take-off thrust of the order of 22,500 kgf. OKB A.M. Lyulka developed them in two versions: a “coaxial” scheme, in which the annular reactor was located behind the conventional combustion chamber, and the turbocharger shaft passed through it; and the "rocker" scheme - with a curved flow part and the removal of the reactor outside the shaft. Myasishchevtsy tried to use both types of engines, finding both advantages and disadvantages in each of them. But the main conclusion, which was contained in the Conclusion to the preliminary draft M-60, was: “... along with the great difficulties in creating the engine, equipment and airframe of the aircraft, completely new problems arise in ensuring ground operation and protecting the crew, population and terrain in the event of a forced landing. These tasks ... are not yet solved. At the same time, it is the possibility of solving these problems that determines the feasibility of creating a manned aircraft with a nuclear engine. Truly prophetic words!
In order to translate the solution of these problems into a practical plane, V.M. Myasishchev began developing a project for a flying laboratory based on the M-50, on which one nuclear engine would be placed in the forward fuselage. And in order to radically increase the survivability of nuclear aircraft bases in the event of a war, it was proposed to completely abandon the use of concrete runways, and turn the nuclear bomber into a supersonic (!) M-60M flying boat. This project was developed in parallel with the land version and retained significant continuity with it. Of course, at the same time, the wing and air intakes of the engines were raised above the water as much as possible. The take-off and landing devices included a nasal hydro-ski, ventral retractable hydrofoils and rotary lateral stability floats at the ends of the wing.
Placement of the reactor and radiation sensors on the Tu-95LAL
The problems facing the designers were the most difficult, but the work went on, and it seemed that all the difficulties could be overcome in a time frame that was significantly less than increasing the flight range of conventional aircraft. In 1958, V.M. Myasishchev, on the instructions of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, prepared a report “The State and Possible Prospects of Strategic Aviation”, in which he unequivocally stated: “... Due to significant criticism of the M-52K and M-56K projects [common-fuel bombers , - auth.] The Ministry of Defense in terms of the insufficiency of the range of such systems, it seems to us useful to focus all work on strategic bombers on the creation of a supersonic bomber system with atomic engines, providing the necessary flight ranges for reconnaissance and for point bombing by suspended aircraft-projectiles and missiles moving and stationary targets.
Myasishchev had in mind, first of all, a new project of a strategic bomber-missile carrier with a closed-cycle nuclear power plant, which was designed by N.D. Kuznetsov Design Bureau. He expected to create this car in 7 years. In 1959, a canard aerodynamic configuration with a delta wing and a significant swept front tail unit was chosen for it. Six nuclear turbojet engines were supposed to be located in the tail section of the aircraft and combined into one or two packages. The reactor was located in the fuselage. It was supposed to use liquid metal as a coolant: lithium or sodium. The engines were able to run on kerosene. The closed cycle of operation of the control system made it possible to make the cockpit ventilated with atmospheric air and greatly reduce the weight of the protection. With a takeoff weight of approximately 170 tons, the mass of engines with heat exchangers was assumed to be 30 tons, protection of the reactor and cockpit 38 tons, payload 25 tons. The length of the aircraft was about 46 m with a wingspan of about 27 m.
The first flight of the M-30 was planned for 1966, but OKB-23 Myasishchev did not even have time to start working design. By government decree, OKB-23 Myasishchev was involved in the development of a multi-stage ballistic missile designed by OKB-52 V.N. Chelomey, and in the fall of 1960 he was liquidated as an independent organization, making branch No. 1 of this OKB and completely reorienting to rocket and space topics. Thus, the backlog of OKB-23 in terms of nuclear aircraft was not translated into real designs.
Tu-95LAL. In the foreground - a container with a radiation sensor
Unlike the team of V.M. Myasishchev, who was trying to create a supersonic strategic aircraft, A.N. Tupolev’s Design Bureau-156 was initially given a more realistic task - to develop a subsonic bomber. In practice, this task was exactly the same as that faced by American designers - to equip an existing machine with a reactor, in this case the Tu-95. However, the Tupolevs had not even had time to comprehend the work ahead, when in December 1955, reports began to arrive through the channels of Soviet intelligence about test flights of the B-36 with a reactor on board in the United States. N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, now an academician, and in those years still a young employee of the Kurchatov Institute, recalls: that in America a plane with a reactor flew. He is now going to the theater, but by the end of the performance he should have information about the possibility of such a project. Merkin gathered us. It was brainstorming. We came to the conclusion that such an aircraft exists. He has a reactor on board, but he flies on conventional fuel. And in the air there is a study of the very scattering of the radiation flux that worries us so much. Without such research, it is impossible to assemble protection on a nuclear aircraft. Merkin went to the theatre, where he told Kurchatov about our findings. After that, Kurchatov invited Tupolev to conduct similar experiments ... ".
On March 28, 1956, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued, according to which the Tupolev Design Bureau began designing a flying nuclear laboratory (LAL) based on the serial Tu-95. The direct participants in these works, V.M. Vul and D.A. Antonov, tell about that time: “...First of all, in accordance with his usual methodology - first to understand everything clearly - A.N. leading nuclear scientists of the country A.P. Aleksandrov, A.I. Leipunsky, N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, V.I. , control system, etc. Very soon lively discussions began at these seminars: how to combine nuclear technology with aircraft requirements and limitations. Here is one example of such discussions: the volume of the reactor plant was initially described to us by nuclear scientists as the volume of a small house. But the OKB linkers managed to greatly "compress" its dimensions, especially protective structures, while fulfilling all the stated requirements for the level of protection for LAL. At one of the seminars, A.N. Tupolev noticed that “... houses are not transported on airplanes” and showed our layout. Nuclear scientists were surprised - they first met with such a compact solution. After a thorough analysis, it was jointly adopted for the LAL on the Tu-95.
Tu-95LAL. Fairings and reactor air intake
During these meetings, the main goals for the creation of LAL were formulated, incl. study of the effect of radiation on aircraft units and systems, verification of the effectiveness of compact radiation protection, experimental study of the reflection of gamma and neutron radiation from air at various flight altitudes, mastering the operation of nuclear power plants. Compact protection has become one of the "know-how" Tupolev. Unlike OKB-23, whose designs provided for placing the crew in a capsule with spherical protection of constant thickness in all directions, the designers of OKB-156 decided to use protection of variable thickness. At the same time, the maximum degree of protection was provided only from direct radiation from the reactor, that is, behind the pilots. At the same time, the side and front shielding of the cabin had to be kept to a minimum, due to the need to absorb radiation reflected from the surrounding air. For an accurate assessment of the level of reflected radiation, in the main, a flight experiment was set up.
For preliminary study and gaining experience with the reactor, it was planned to build a ground test bench, design work according to which they were entrusted to the Tomilinsky branch of the Design Bureau, headed by I.F. Nezval. The stand was created on the basis of the middle part of the Tu-95 fuselage, and the reactor was installed on a special platform with a lift, and if necessary, it could be lowered. Radiation protection at the stand, and then at the LAL, was made using materials that were completely new for aviation, the production of which required new technologies.
Tu-95LAL. Reactor dismantling.
The Tu-95M serial strategic bomber No. 7800408 with four NK-12M turboprop engines with a power of 15,000 hp was converted into a flying laboratory, which received the designation Tu-95LAL. All weapons from the aircraft were removed. The crew and experimenters were in the front pressurized cabin, which also housed a sensor that recorded the penetrating radiation. Behind the cockpit, a protective screen made of a 5-cm lead plate and combined materials (polyethylene and ceresin) with a total thickness of about 20 cm was installed. A second sensor was installed in the bomb bay, where the combat load was to be located in the future. Behind him, closer to the tail of the aircraft, was the reactor. The third sensor was in the rear cab of the car. Two more sensors were mounted under the wing panels in non-removable metal fairings. All sensors were rotatable around a vertical axis for orientation in the desired direction.
The reactor itself was surrounded by a powerful protective shell, also consisting of lead and combined materials, and had no connection with the aircraft engines - it served only as a source of radiation. Distilled water was used in it as a neutron moderator and, at the same time, as a coolant. The heated water gave off heat in an intermediate heat exchanger, which was part of a closed primary water circulation circuit. Through its metal walls, heat was removed to the water of the secondary circuit, in which it was dissipated in a water-air radiator. The latter was blown in flight by a stream of air through a large air intake under the fuselage. The reactor slightly extended beyond the contours of the aircraft fuselage and was covered with metal fairings from above, below and on the sides. Since the all-round protection of the reactor was considered to be sufficiently effective, windows that could be opened in flight were provided in it for conducting experiments on reflected radiation. The windows made it possible to create beams of radiation in various directions. Their opening and closing was controlled from the experimenter's console in the cockpit.
The project of a nuclear anti-submarine aircraft based on the Tu-114
Tu-95LAL construction and equipment necessary equipment occupied 1959-60. By the spring of 1961, “... the plane was standing at the airfield near Moscow,” N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy continues the story, “and Tupolev arrived with Minister Dementyev to look at him. Tupolev explained the radiation protection system: "... It is necessary that there is not the slightest gap, otherwise the neutrons will come out through it." "So what?" the minister did not understand. And then Tupolev explained in a simple way: “On a frosty day, you will go out onto the airfield, and your fly will be unbuttoned - everything will freeze!”. The minister laughed – they say, now everything is clear with neutrons…”.
From May to August 1961, 34 flights were performed on the Tu-95LAL. The aircraft was flown by test pilots M.M. Nyukhtikov, E.A. Goryunov, M.A. Zhila and others, the engineer N.V. Lashkevich was the leader of the car. The head of the experiment, nuclear scientist N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy and operator V. Mordashev, took part in the flight tests. The flights took place both with a "cold" reactor and with a working one. Studies of the radiation situation in the cockpit and overboard were carried out by physicists V. Madeev and S. Korolev.
Tests of the Tu-95LAL showed a fairly high efficiency of the applied radiation protection system, but at the same time revealed its bulkiness, too much weight and the need for further improvement. And the main danger of a nuclear aircraft was recognized as the possibility of its accident and the contamination of large spaces with nuclear components.
The further fate of the Tu-95LAL aircraft is similar to the fate of many other aircraft in the Soviet Union - it was destroyed. After completing the test, he for a long time stood at one of the airfields near Semipalatinsk, and in the early 1970s. was transferred to the training airfield of the Irkutsk Military Aviation Technical School. The head of the school, Major General S.G. Kalitsov, who had previously served for many years in long-range aviation, had a dream of creating a museum of long-range aviation. Naturally, the fuel elements from the reactor core have already been withdrawn. During the Gorbachev period of strategic arms reduction, the aircraft was considered a combat unit, taken apart and thrown into a landfill, from which it disappeared into scrap metal.
The program assumed that in the 1970s. the development of a series of nuclear supersonic heavy aircraft under the single designation "120" (Tu-120) will begin. It was assumed that all of them would be equipped with closed-cycle nuclear turbojet engines developed by N.D. Kuznetsov Design Bureau. The first in this series was to be a long-range bomber, close in purpose to the Tu-22. The aircraft was carried out according to the normal aerodynamic configuration and was a high-wing aircraft with swept wings and empennage, a bicycle chassis, a reactor with two engines in the rear fuselage, at a maximum distance from the cockpit. The second project was a low-altitude strike aircraft with a low delta wing. The third was the project of a long-range strategic bomber with
And yet, the Tupolev program, like Myasishchev's projects, was not destined to translate into real designs. Albeit a few years later, but the government of the USSR closed it too. The reasons, by and large, were the same as in the United States. The main thing - the atomic bomber turned out to be an unbearably complex and expensive weapon system. The newly appeared intercontinental ballistic missiles solved the problem of the total destruction of the enemy much cheaper, faster and, so to speak, more guaranteed. And the Soviet country did not have enough money either - at that time there was an intensive deployment of ICBMs and a nuclear submarine fleet, which took all the funds. The unresolved problems of the safe operation of nuclear aircraft also played their role. Political excitement also left the Soviet leadership: by that time, the Americans had already curtailed work in this area, and there was no one to catch up, and it was too expensive and dangerous to go ahead.
Nevertheless, the closure of the atomic subject in the Tupolev Design Bureau did not mean the abandonment of the nuclear power plant as such. The military-political leadership of the USSR only refused to use the atomic aircraft as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction directly to the target. This task was assigned to ballistic missiles, incl. based on submarines. Submarines could secretly be on duty for months off the coast of America and at any moment deliver a lightning strike at close range. Naturally, the Americans began to take measures aimed at combating Soviet missile submarines, and specially created attack submarines turned out to be the best means of such a struggle. In response, Soviet strategists decided to organize a hunt for these secretive and mobile ships, and even in areas thousands of miles away from their native shores. It was recognized that a fairly large anti-submarine aircraft with an unlimited flight range, which only a nuclear reactor could provide, could most effectively cope with such a task.
In general, they installed the reactor on the platform, rolled into An-22 No. 01-07 and flew to Semipalatinsk in early September. Pilots V.Samovarov and S.Gorbik, lead engine engineer V.Vorotnikov, head of the ground crew A.Eskin and I, the lead designer for the special installation, participated in the program from the Antonov Design Bureau. With us was a representative of CIAM BN Omelin. The military, nuclear scientists from Obninsk, joined at the test site, in total there were 100 people. The group was led by Colonel Gerasimov. The test program was named "Stork" and we drew a small silhouette of this bird on the side of the reactor. There were no special external designations on the plane. All 23 flights under the Aist program went smoothly, there was only one emergency. Once an An-22 took off for a three-hour flight, but immediately landed. The reactor did not turn on. The reason turned out to be a poor-quality plug connector, in which contact was broken all the time. We figured it out, put a match into the SR - everything worked. So they flew with a match until the end of the program.
In parting, as usual in such cases, they arranged a small feast. It was a celebration of men who did their job. We drank, talked with the military, physicists. We were glad that we were returning home to our families. But physicists became more and more gloomy: most of them were left by their wives: 15-20 years of work in the field of nuclear research had a negative impact on their health. But they had other consolations: after our flights, five of them became doctors of science, and fifteen people became candidates.”
So, a new series of flight experiments with a reactor on board was completed successfully, the necessary data were obtained for designing a sufficiently efficient and safe aviation nuclear control system. The Soviet Union nevertheless overtook the United States, coming close to creating a real nuclear aircraft. This machine was radically different from the concepts of the 1950s. with open cycle reactors, the operation of which would be associated with enormous difficulties and causing enormous harm environment. Thanks to the new protection and the closed cycle, radiation contamination of the aircraft structure and air was minimized, and in environmental terms, such a machine even had certain advantages over chemical-fueled aircraft. In any case, if everything is working properly, then the exhaust jet of an atomic engine contains nothing but clean heated air.
4. Combined turbojet-nuclear engine:
1 - electric starter; 2 - shutters; 3 - air duct of the direct-flow circuit; 4 - compressor;
5 - combustion chamber; 6 - nuclear reactor body; 7 - fuel assembly.
But this is if ... In the event of a flight accident, the problems of environmental safety in the An-22PLO project were not sufficiently resolved. Shooting the carbon rods into the core did stop the chain reaction, but again, if the reactor was not damaged. But what happens if this happens as a result of hitting the ground, and the rods do not take the desired position? It seems that it was the danger of such a development of events that did not allow this project to be realized in metal.
However, Soviet designers and scientists continued to search for a solution to the problem. Moreover, in addition to the anti-submarine function, a new application has been found for the nuclear aircraft. It arose as a logical development of the tendency to increase the invulnerability of ICBM launchers as a result of making them mobile. In the early 1980s The United States developed the strategic MX system, in which missiles were constantly moving between numerous shelters, depriving the enemy of even the theoretical possibility of destroying them with a pinpoint strike. In the USSR, intercontinental missiles were installed on automobile chassis and railway platforms. The next logical step would be to put them on a plane that would barrage over its territory or over the ocean expanses. Due to its mobility, it would be invulnerable to enemy missile attacks. The main quality of such an aircraft was as more time stay in flight, which means that the nuclear control system suited him perfectly.
... The implementation of this project was prevented by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The motive was repeated, quite often found in the history of domestic aviation: as soon as everything was ready to solve the problem, the problem itself disappeared. But we, the survivors of the Chernobyl disaster, are not very upset about this. And only the question arises: how to relate to the colossal intellectual and material costs incurred by the USSR and the USA, trying for decades to create a nuclear aircraft? After all, everything is in vain! .. Not really. Americans have an expression: "We look beyond the horizon." This is what they say when they do work, knowing that they themselves will never benefit from its results, that these results can only be useful in the distant future. Maybe someday humanity will once again set itself the task of building an aircraft powered by nuclear energy. Maybe even it will not be a combat aircraft, but a cargo or, say, a scientific aircraft. And then future designers will be able to rely on the results of the work of our contemporaries. Who just looked over the horizon ...
During the Cold War, the parties threw all their efforts into finding a reliable means of delivering "special cargo".
In the late 40s, the scales leaned towards the bombers. The next decade was the "golden age" of aviation development.
Huge funding contributed to the emergence of the most fantastic aircraft, but the most incredible to this day seem to be the projects of supersonic bombers with nuclear rocket launchers developed in the USSR.
M-60
The M-60 bomber was supposed to be the first nuclear-powered aircraft in the USSR. It was created according to the drawings of its predecessor M-50 adapted for a nuclear reactor. The developed aircraft was supposed to reach speeds of up to 3200 km / h, with a weight of over 250 tons.Special engine
A turbojet engine with a nuclear reactor (TRDA) is based on a conventional turbojet engine (TRD). Only in contrast to the turbojet engine, thrust in a nuclear engine is provided by heated air passing through the reactor, and not by the hot gases emitted during the combustion of kerosene.
Design feature
Looking at the layouts and sketches of all nuclear aircraft of that time, one can notice one important detail: they do not have a cockpit for the crew. To protect against radiation, the crew of a nuclear aircraft was located in a sealed lead capsule. And the lack of a visual review was replaced by an optical periscope, television and radar screens.
Autonomous control
Taking off and landing with a periscope is not an easy task. When the engineers realized this, a logical idea appeared - to make the aircraft unmanned. This decision also made it possible to reduce the weight of the bomber. However, for strategic reasons, the Air Force did not approve the project.
Nuclear seaplane M-60
At the same time, under the M-60M index, a supersonic aircraft with a nuclear engine capable of landing on water was being developed in parallel. Such seaplanes were placed in special self-propelled docks at bases on the coast. In March 1957, the project was closed, as nuclear-powered aircraft emitted a strong background radiation in their bases and adjacent waters.
M-30
The rejection of the M-60 project did not mean the end of work in this direction. And already in 1959, aircraft designers began to develop a new jet aircraft. This time, the thrust of its engines is provided by a new “closed” type nuclear power plant. By 1960, the preliminary design of the M-30 was ready. The new engine reduced the radioactive release, and it became possible to install a cockpit for the crew on the new aircraft. It was believed that no later than 1966, the M-30 would take to the air.
Funeral of a nuclear aircraft
But in 1960, Khrushchev, at a meeting on the prospects for the development of strategic weapons systems, made a decision for which he is still called the gravedigger of aviation. After the scattered and indecisive reports of aircraft designers, they were asked to take on some of the orders on missile topics. All developments of nuclear-powered aircraft were frozen. Fortunately or unfortunately, it is no longer possible to find out what our world would have been like if the aircraft designers of the past had nevertheless completed their undertakings.
M-60 strategic atomic bomber project
Let's start with the fact that in the 1950s. in the USSR, unlike the United States, the creation of an atomic bomber was perceived not just as desirable, even very, but as a vital task. This attitude was formed among the top leadership of the army and the military-industrial complex as a result of the realization of two circumstances. Firstly, the huge, overwhelming advantage of the States in terms of the very possibility of atomic bombing of the territory of a potential enemy. Operating from dozens of air bases in Europe, the Middle and Far East, US aircraft, even with a flight range of only 5-10 thousand km, could reach any point in the USSR and return back. Soviet bombers were forced to work from airfields on their own territory, and for a similar raid on the United States they had to overcome 15-20 thousand km. There were no planes with such a range in the USSR at all. The first Soviet strategic bombers M-4 and Tu-95 could "cover" only the very north of the United States and relatively small sections of both coasts. But even these machines in 1957, there were only 22. And the number of American aircraft capable of attacking the USSR had reached 1800 by that time! Moreover, these were first-class bombers carrying atomic weapons B-52, B-36, B-47, and a couple of years later they were joined by supersonic B-58s.
Secondly, the task of creating a jet bomber of the required flight range with a conventional power plant in the 1950s. seemed overwhelmingly difficult. Moreover, supersonic, the need for which was dictated by the rapid development of air defense systems. The flights of the USSR's first supersonic strategic carrier M-50 showed that with a load of 3-5 tons, even with two refuelings in the air, its range can hardly reach 15,000 km. But no one could answer how to refuel at supersonic speed, and besides, over enemy territory. The need for refueling significantly reduced the likelihood of completing a combat mission, and in addition, such a flight required a huge amount of fuel - in the amount of more than 500 tons for refueling and refueling aircraft. That is, in just one sortie, a regiment of bombers could use up more than 10,000 tons of kerosene! Even the simple accumulation of such reserves of fuel grew into a huge problem, not to mention the safe storage and protection from possible air strikes.
At the same time, the country had a powerful research and production base for solving various problems of using nuclear energy. It originated from Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences, organized under the leadership of I.V. Kurchatov at the height of the Great Patriotic War - in April 1943. At first, the main task of nuclear scientists was to create a uranium bomb, but then an active search for other possibilities began. use of a new type of energy. In March 1947 - only a year later than in the USA - in the USSR for the first time at the state level (at a meeting of the Scientific and Technical Council of the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers) the problem of using the heat of nuclear reactions in power plants was raised. The Council decided to start systematic research in this direction with the aim of developing the scientific basis for obtaining electricity using nuclear fission, as well as propulsion of ships, submarines and aircraft.
The future academician A.P. Aleksandrov became the scientific supervisor of the work. Several variants of nuclear aviation power plants were considered: open and closed cycle based on ramjet, turbojet and turboprop engines. Various types of reactors were developed: with air and with intermediate liquid metal cooling, on thermal and fast neutrons, etc. Coolants acceptable for use in aviation and methods for protecting the crew and onboard equipment from exposure to radiation were studied. In June 1952, Alexandrov reported to Kurchatov: "... Our knowledge in the field of nuclear reactors allows us to raise the question of creating nuclear-powered engines used for heavy aircraft in the coming years ...".
However, it took another three years for the idea to make its way. During this time, the first M-4 and Tu-95 managed to take to the skies, the world's first nuclear power plant began to operate in the Moscow region, and the construction of the first Soviet nuclear submarine began. Our agents in the United States began to transmit information about the large-scale work being carried out there to create an atomic bomber. These data were perceived as confirmation of the promise of a new type of energy for aviation. Finally, on August 12, 1955, Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1561-868 was issued, ordering a number of aviation industry enterprises to begin work on nuclear topics. In particular, OKB-156 of A.N. Tupolev, OKB-23 of V.M. Myasishchev and OKB-301 of S.A. Kuznetsov and OKB-165 A.M. Lyulka - the development of such control systems.
The most technically simple task was assigned to OKB-301, headed by S.A. Lavochkin - to develop an experimental cruise missile "375" with a nuclear ramjet engine designed by M.M. Bondaryuk OKB-670. The place of a conventional combustion chamber in this engine was occupied by an open-cycle reactor - air flowed directly through the core. The design of the rocket airframe was based on the developments on the intercontinental cruise missile "350" with a conventional ramjet. Despite its relative simplicity, the theme of "375" did not receive any significant development, and the death of S.A. Lavochkin in June 1960 completely put an end to these works.
The Myasishchev team, then engaged in the creation of the M-50, was ordered to carry out a preliminary project of a supersonic bomber "with special engines of the chief designer A.M. Lyulka." In the Design Bureau, the theme received the index "60", Yu.N. Trufanov was appointed the lead designer for it. Since, in the most general terms, the solution to the problem was seen in simply equipping the M-50 with nuclear-powered engines, and operating on an open cycle (for reasons of simplicity), it was believed that the M-60 would be the first nuclear aircraft in the USSR. However, by the middle of 1956, it became clear that the problem posed could not be solved so simply. It turned out that the machine with the new control system has a number of specific features that aircraft designers have never encountered before. The novelty of the problems that arose was so great that no one in the Design Bureau, and indeed in the entire mighty Soviet aircraft industry, had no idea how to approach their solution.
The first problem was the protection of people from radioactive radiation. What should she be? How much should you weigh? How to ensure the normal functioning of the crew enclosed in an impenetrable thick-walled capsule, incl. review from workplaces and emergency escape? The second problem is a sharp deterioration in the properties of familiar structural materials caused by powerful radiation and heat flows emanating from the reactor. Hence the need to create new materials. The third is the need to develop a completely new technology for the operation of nuclear aircraft and the construction of appropriate air bases with numerous underground facilities. After all, it turned out that after stopping the open cycle engine, not a single person will be able to approach it for another 2-3 months! This means that there is a need for remote ground maintenance of the aircraft and engine. And, of course, safety issues - in the broadest sense, especially in the event of an accident of such an aircraft.
Awareness of these and many other problems of stone on stone did not leave the original idea to use the M-50 glider. The designers focused on finding a new layout in which the above problems seemed to be solvable. At the same time, the main criterion for choosing the location of the nuclear power plant on the aircraft was recognized as its maximum distance from the crew. In accordance with this, a preliminary design of the M-60 was developed, on which four nuclear turbojet engines were located in the rear fuselage in pairs in “two floors”, forming a single nuclear compartment. The aircraft had a mid-wing scheme with a thin cantilever trapezoidal wing and the same horizontal tail located at the top of the keel. Rocket and bomb weapons were planned to be placed on the internal suspension. The length of the aircraft was to be about 66 m, the takeoff weight was to exceed 250 tons, and the cruising speed of flight was to be 3000 km/h at an altitude of 18000-20000 m.
The crew was supposed to be placed in a blind capsule with powerful multi-layer protection made of special materials. The radioactivity of atmospheric air excluded the possibility of using it for pressurization of the cabin and breathing. For these purposes, it was necessary to use an oxygen-nitrogen mixture obtained in special gasifiers by evaporating liquid gases on board. The lack of visual visibility had to be compensated by periscopes, television and radar screens, as well as the installation of a fully automatic aircraft control system. The latter was supposed to provide all stages of the flight, including takeoff and landing, access to the target, etc. This logically led to the idea of an unmanned strategic bomber. However, the Air Force insisted on a manned version as more reliable and flexible in use.
Nuclear turbojet engines for the M-60 were supposed to develop a take-off thrust of the order of 22,500 kgf. OKB A.M. Lyulka developed them in two versions: a “coaxial” scheme, in which the annular reactor was located behind the conventional combustion chamber, and the turbocharger shaft passed through it; and the "rocker" scheme - with a curved flow part and the removal of the reactor outside the shaft. Myasishchevtsy tried to use both types of engines, finding both advantages and disadvantages in each of them. But the main conclusion, which was contained in the Conclusion to the preliminary draft M-60, was: “... along with the great difficulties in creating the engine, equipment and airframe of the aircraft, completely new problems arise in ensuring ground operation and protecting the crew, population and terrain in the event of a forced landing. These tasks ... are not yet solved. At the same time, it is the possibility of solving these problems that determines the feasibility of creating a manned aircraft with a nuclear engine. Truly prophetic words!
In order to translate the solution of these problems into a practical plane, V.M. Myasishchev began developing a project for a flying laboratory based on the M-50, on which one nuclear engine would be placed in the forward fuselage. And in order to radically increase the survivability of nuclear aircraft bases in the event of a war, it was proposed to completely abandon the use of concrete runways, and turn the nuclear bomber into a supersonic (!) M-60M flying boat. This project was developed in parallel with the land version and retained significant continuity with it. Of course, at the same time, the wing and air intakes of the engines were raised above the water as much as possible. The take-off and landing devices included a nasal hydro-ski, ventral retractable hydrofoils and rotary lateral stability floats at the ends of the wing.
The problems facing the designers were the most difficult, but the work went on, and it seemed that all the difficulties could be overcome in a time frame that was significantly less than increasing the flight range of conventional aircraft. In 1958, V.M. Myasishchev, on the instructions of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, prepared a report “The State and Possible Prospects of Strategic Aviation”, in which he unequivocally stated: “... Due to significant criticism of the M-52K and M-56K projects [common-fuel bombers , - auth.] The Ministry of Defense in terms of the insufficiency of the range of such systems, it seems to us useful to focus all work on strategic bombers on the creation of a supersonic bomber system with atomic engines, providing the necessary flight ranges for reconnaissance and for point bombing by suspended aircraft-projectiles and missiles moving and stationary targets.
Myasishchev had in mind, first of all, a new project of a strategic bomber-missile carrier with a closed-cycle nuclear power plant, which was designed by N.D. Kuznetsov Design Bureau. He expected to create this car in 7 years. In 1959, a canard aerodynamic configuration with a delta wing and a significant swept front tail unit was chosen for it. Six nuclear turbojet engines were supposed to be located in the tail section of the aircraft and combined into one or two packages. The reactor was located in the fuselage. It was supposed to use liquid metal as a coolant: lithium or sodium. The engines were able to run on kerosene. The closed cycle of operation of the control system made it possible to make the cockpit ventilated with atmospheric air and greatly reduce the weight of the protection. With a takeoff weight of approximately 170 tons, the mass of engines with heat exchangers was assumed to be 30 tons, protection of the reactor and cockpit 38 tons, payload 25 tons. The length of the aircraft was about 46 m with a wingspan of about 27 m.
The first flight of the M-30 was planned for 1966, but OKB-23 Myasishchev did not even have time to start working design. By government decree, OKB-23 Myasishchev was involved in the development of a multi-stage ballistic missile designed by OKB-52 V.N. Chelomey, and in the fall of 1960 he was liquidated as an independent organization, making branch No. 1 of this OKB and completely reorienting to rocket and space topics. Thus, the backlog of OKB-23 in terms of nuclear aircraft was not translated into real designs.
Unlike the team of V.M. Myasishchev, who was trying to create a supersonic strategic aircraft, A.N. Tupolev’s Design Bureau-156 was initially given a more realistic task - to develop a subsonic bomber. In practice, this task was exactly the same as that faced by American designers - to equip an existing machine with a reactor, in this case the Tu-95. However, the Tupolevs had not even had time to comprehend the work ahead, when in December 1955, reports began to arrive through the channels of Soviet intelligence about test flights of the B-36 with a reactor on board in the United States. N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, now an academician, and in those years still a young employee of the Kurchatov Institute, recalls: that in America a plane with a reactor flew. He is now going to the theater, but by the end of the performance he should have information about the possibility of such a project. Merkin gathered us. It was brainstorming. We came to the conclusion that such an aircraft exists. He has a reactor on board, but he flies on conventional fuel. And in the air there is a study of the very scattering of the radiation flux that worries us so much. Without such research, it is impossible to assemble protection on a nuclear aircraft. Merkin went to the theatre, where he told Kurchatov about our findings. After that, Kurchatov invited Tupolev to conduct similar experiments ... ".
On March 28, 1956, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued, according to which the Tupolev Design Bureau began designing a flying nuclear laboratory (LAL) based on the serial Tu-95. The direct participants in these works, V.M. Vul and D.A. Antonov, tell about that time: “...First of all, in accordance with his usual methodology - first to understand everything clearly - A.N. leading nuclear scientists of the country A.P. Aleksandrov, A.I. Leipunsky, N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, V.I. , control system, etc. Very soon lively discussions began at these seminars: how to combine nuclear technology with aircraft requirements and limitations. Here is one example of such discussions: the volume of the reactor plant was initially described to us by nuclear scientists as the volume of a small house. But the OKB linkers managed to greatly "compress" its dimensions, especially protective structures, while fulfilling all the stated requirements for the level of protection for LAL. At one of the seminars, A.N. Tupolev noticed that “... houses are not transported on airplanes” and showed our layout. Nuclear scientists were surprised - they first met with such a compact solution. After a thorough analysis, it was jointly adopted for the LAL on the Tu-95.
During these meetings, the main goals for the creation of LAL were formulated, incl. study of the effect of radiation on aircraft units and systems, verification of the effectiveness of compact radiation protection, experimental study of the reflection of gamma and neutron radiation from air at various flight altitudes, mastering the operation of nuclear power plants. Compact protection has become one of the "know-how" Tupolev. Unlike OKB-23, whose designs provided for placing the crew in a capsule with spherical protection of constant thickness in all directions, the designers of OKB-156 decided to use protection of variable thickness. At the same time, the maximum degree of protection was provided only from direct radiation from the reactor, that is, behind the pilots. At the same time, the side and front shielding of the cabin had to be kept to a minimum, due to the need to absorb radiation reflected from the surrounding air. For an accurate assessment of the level of reflected radiation, in the main, a flight experiment was set up.
For a preliminary study and gaining experience with the reactor, it was planned to build a ground test bench, the design work on which was entrusted to the Tomilin branch of the Design Bureau, headed by I.F. Nezval. The stand was created on the basis of the middle part of the Tu-95 fuselage, and the reactor was installed on a special platform with a lift, and if necessary, it could be lowered. Radiation protection at the stand, and then at the LAL, was made using materials that were completely new for aviation, the production of which required new technologies.
The construction of the Tu-95LAL and equipping with the necessary equipment took 1959-60. By the spring of 1961, “... the plane was standing at the airfield near Moscow,” continues the story of N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, “and Tupolev arrived with Minister Dementyev to look at him. Tupolev explained the radiation protection system: "... It is necessary that there is not the slightest gap, otherwise the neutrons will come out through it." "So what?" the minister did not understand. And then Tupolev explained in a simple way: “On a frosty day, you will go out onto the airfield, and your fly will be unbuttoned - everything will freeze!”. The minister laughed – they say, now everything is clear with neutrons…”.
From May to August 1961, 34 flights were performed on the Tu-95LAL. The aircraft was flown by test pilots M.M. Nyukhtikov, E.A. Goryunov, M.A. Zhila and others, the engineer N.V. Lashkevich was the leader of the car. The head of the experiment, nuclear scientist N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy and operator V. Mordashev, took part in the flight tests. The flights took place both with a "cold" reactor and with a working one. Studies of the radiation situation in the cockpit and overboard were carried out by physicists V. Madeev and S. Korolev.
Tests of the Tu-95LAL showed a fairly high efficiency of the applied radiation protection system, but at the same time revealed its bulkiness, too much weight and the need for further improvement. And the main danger of a nuclear aircraft was recognized as the possibility of its accident and the contamination of large spaces with nuclear components.
The further fate of the Tu-95LAL aircraft is similar to the fate of many other aircraft in the Soviet Union - it was destroyed. After completing the tests, he stood for a long time at one of the airfields near Semipalatinsk, and in the early 1970s. was transferred to the training airfield of the Irkutsk Military Aviation Technical School. The head of the school, Major General S.G. Kalitsov, who had previously served for many years in long-range aviation, had a dream of creating a museum of long-range aviation. Naturally, the fuel elements from the reactor core have already been withdrawn. During the Gorbachev period of strategic arms reduction, the aircraft was considered a combat unit, taken apart and thrown into a landfill, from which it disappeared into scrap metal.
The program assumed that in the 1970s. the development of a series of nuclear supersonic heavy aircraft under the single designation "120" (Tu-120) will begin. It was assumed that all of them would be equipped with closed-cycle nuclear turbojet engines developed by N.D. Kuznetsov Design Bureau. The first in this series was to be a long-range bomber, close in purpose to the Tu-22. The aircraft was carried out according to the normal aerodynamic configuration and was a high-wing aircraft with swept wings and empennage, a bicycle chassis, a reactor with two engines in the rear fuselage, at a maximum distance from the cockpit. The second project was a low-altitude strike aircraft with a low delta wing. The third was the project of a long-range strategic bomber with
And yet, the Tupolev program, like Myasishchev's projects, was not destined to translate into real designs. Albeit a few years later, but the government of the USSR closed it too. The reasons, by and large, were the same as in the United States. The main thing - the atomic bomber turned out to be an unbearably complex and expensive weapon system. The newly appeared intercontinental ballistic missiles solved the problem of the total destruction of the enemy much cheaper, faster and, so to speak, more guaranteed. And the Soviet country did not have enough money either - at that time there was an intensive deployment of ICBMs and a nuclear submarine fleet, which took all the funds. The unresolved problems of the safe operation of nuclear aircraft also played their role. Political excitement also left the Soviet leadership: by that time, the Americans had already curtailed work in this area, and there was no one to catch up, and it was too expensive and dangerous to go ahead.
Nevertheless, the closure of the atomic subject in the Tupolev Design Bureau did not mean the abandonment of the nuclear power plant as such. The military-political leadership of the USSR only refused to use the atomic aircraft as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction directly to the target. This task was assigned to ballistic missiles, incl. based on submarines. Submarines could secretly be on duty for months off the coast of America and at any moment deliver a lightning strike at close range. Naturally, the Americans began to take measures aimed at combating Soviet missile submarines, and specially created attack submarines turned out to be the best means of such a struggle. In response, Soviet strategists decided to organize a hunt for these secretive and mobile ships, and even in areas thousands of miles away from their native shores. It was recognized that a fairly large anti-submarine aircraft with an unlimited flight range, which only a nuclear reactor could provide, could most effectively cope with such a task. In general, they installed the reactor on a platform, rolled into An-22 No. to Semipalatinsk. Pilots V.Samovarov and S.Gorbik, lead engine engineer V.Vorotnikov, head of the ground crew A.Eskin and I, the lead designer for the special installation, participated in the program from the Antonov Design Bureau. With us was a representative of CIAM BN Omelin. The military, nuclear scientists from Obninsk, joined at the test site, in total there were 100 people. The group was led by Colonel Gerasimov. The test program was named "Stork" and we drew a small silhouette of this bird on the side of the reactor. There were no special external designations on the plane. All 23 flights under the Aist program went smoothly, there was only one emergency. Once an An-22 took off for a three-hour flight, but immediately landed. The reactor did not turn on. The reason turned out to be a poor-quality plug connector, in which contact was broken all the time. We figured it out, put a match into the SR - everything worked. So they flew with a match until the end of the program.
In parting, as usual in such cases, they arranged a small feast. It was a celebration of men who did their job. We drank, talked with the military, physicists. We were glad that we were returning home to our families. But physicists became more and more gloomy: most of them were left by their wives: 15-20 years of work in the field of nuclear research had a negative impact on their health. But they had other consolations: after our flights, five of them became doctors of science, and fifteen people became candidates.”
So, a new series of flight experiments with a reactor on board was completed successfully, the necessary data were obtained for designing a sufficiently efficient and safe aviation nuclear control system. The Soviet Union nevertheless overtook the United States, coming close to creating a real nuclear aircraft. This machine was radically different from the concepts of the 1950s. with open cycle reactors, the operation of which would be associated with enormous difficulties and causing enormous harm to the environment. Thanks to the new protection and the closed cycle, radiation contamination of the aircraft structure and air was minimized, and in environmental terms, such a machine even had certain advantages over chemical-fueled aircraft. In any case, if everything is working properly, then the exhaust jet of an atomic engine contains nothing but clean heated air.
4. Combined turbojet-nuclear engine:
1 - electric starter; 2 - shutters; 3 - air duct of the direct-flow circuit; 4 - compressor;
5 - combustion chamber; 6 - nuclear reactor body; 7 - fuel assembly.
But this is if ... In the event of a flight accident, the problems of environmental safety in the An-22PLO project were not sufficiently resolved. Shooting the carbon rods into the core did stop the chain reaction, but again, if the reactor was not damaged. But what happens if this happens as a result of hitting the ground, and the rods do not take the desired position? It seems that it was the danger of such a development of events that did not allow this project to be realized in metal.
However, Soviet designers and scientists continued to search for a solution to the problem. Moreover, in addition to the anti-submarine function, a new application has been found for the nuclear aircraft. It arose as a logical development of the tendency to increase the invulnerability of ICBM launchers as a result of making them mobile. In the early 1980s The United States developed the strategic MX system, in which missiles were constantly moving between numerous shelters, depriving the enemy of even the theoretical possibility of destroying them with a pinpoint strike. In the USSR, intercontinental missiles were installed on automobile chassis and railway platforms. The next logical step would be to put them on a plane that would barrage over its territory or over the ocean expanses. Due to its mobility, it would be invulnerable to enemy missile attacks. The main quality of such an aircraft was the longest possible flight time, which means that the nuclear control system suited him perfectly.
... The implementation of this project was prevented by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The motive was repeated, quite often found in the history of domestic aviation: as soon as everything was ready to solve the problem, the problem itself disappeared. But we, the survivors of the Chernobyl disaster, are not very upset about this. And only the question arises: how to relate to the colossal intellectual and material costs incurred by the USSR and the USA, trying for decades to create a nuclear aircraft? After all, everything is in vain! .. Not really. Americans have an expression: "We look beyond the horizon." This is what they say when they do work, knowing that they themselves will never benefit from its results, that these results can only be useful in the distant future. Maybe someday humanity will once again set itself the task of building an aircraft powered by nuclear energy. Maybe even it will not be a combat aircraft, but a cargo or, say, a scientific aircraft. And then future designers will be able to rely on the results of the work of our contemporaries. Who just looked over the horizon ...
