This article discusses some economic aspects of the development of the domestic military-industrial complex during the Soviet period in the history of the 20th century. In our work, we rely heavily on archival data.
During the years of the Civil War and "war communism", in conditions of international isolation, all weapons had to be produced within the country, relying on domestic resources. Since 1919, enterprises that served artillery, navy, aviation, sapper troops and commissariats were removed from the jurisdiction of various departments and transferred to the Council of the Military Industry of the All-Russian Council of the National Economy (VSNKh).
With the transition to the New Economic Policy, the reorganization of the management of the national economy began. In the state industry, including the military, group associations began to be created - trusts, which were supposed to work on the principles of cost accounting. In accordance with the decree on trusts of April 10, 1923, the Main Directorate of the Military Industry of the USSR was created as part of the Supreme Council of National Economy, to which weapons, cartridge, gun, gunpowder, aviation and other factories of a military profile were subordinate; Aviatrust existed independently. In 1925, the military industry came under the jurisdiction of the Military Industrial Directorate of the Supreme Council of National Economy, consisting of 4 trusts - weapons and arsenal, cartridge and tube, military chemical and rifle and machine gun.
In general, the military industry since the mid-20s. began to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies of the state, self-supporting principles in this area turned out to be unviable. With the onset of accelerated industrialization, there was a transition to a more rigid system of state planning and industrial management, first through the system of sectoral central administrations, and then sectoral ministries 1 .
Bystrova Irina Vladimirovna - Doctor of Historical Sciences (Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences).
The starting point for a new round of militarization and the creation of a military industry can be considered the so-called period of the "military threat" of 1926-1927. and the subsequent rejection of the NEP - the "great turning point" of 1929. By the decision of the Administrative Meeting of the Council of Labor and Defense (RZ STO) of June 25, 1927, the Mobilization and Planning Directorate of the Supreme Economic Council was created, which was supposed to lead the preparation of industry for war. The main "working apparatus" of the RZ STO in matters of preparation for war were the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, which was responsible for preparing the army, and the State Planning Committee of the USSR, which was in charge of developing control figures for the national economy "in case of war." The People's Commissariat of Finance, in turn, had to consider "estimated emergency expenses for the first month of the war" 2 .
In specially developed resolutions of the State Planning Commission and the RZ STO, according to the control figures for the 1927/28 financial year, this time period was considered as “a conditional period when the main processes of transition to working conditions during the war (mobilization) are taking place in the national economy”, and the entire next year - as the period when "the main transient processes have already been completed." In the context of the "military threat" most of these plans had a paper-declarative character. Military spending has not yet grown significantly: the main funds were directed to the preparation of the "industrial leap", and the defense industry has not yet been allocated organizationally.
This period includes the emergence of secret, numbered factories. At the end of the 20s. "Personnel" military factories began to be assigned numbers, behind which the former names were hidden. In 1927, there were 56 such factories, and by April 1934, the list of "personnel" military factories approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks included 68 enterprises. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated July 13, 1934 established a special regime and benefits for defense enterprises - the so-called special regime plants.
The main task of the secrecy regime was “to ensure the greatest safety of factories of defense importance, to create strong guarantees against the penetration of class-hostile, counter-revolutionary and hostile elements into them, as well as to prevent their actions aimed at disrupting or weakening production activities factories" 3 . This system was greatly strengthened and expanded in the post-war "nuclear" era of the development of the defense industry.
To finance the so-called special works of a narrow defense nature at civilian industry enterprises, special loans were allocated from the budget, which had the intended purpose of ensuring the independence of defense work from the general financial condition enterprises 4 . The figures for the actual military expenditures of the state were allocated in the budget as a separate line and were kept secret.
The emergence of specific defense industries became possible only on the basis of accelerated industrialization and the creation of heavy industry. After the liquidation of the Supreme Council of National Economy in 1932, the defense industry passed into the system of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Since the mid 30s. the process of organizational isolation of the defense industry from the basic branches of heavy industry began. In 1936, military production was allocated to the People's Commissariat for Defense Industry (NKOP). This was the stage of "quantitative accumulation". The growth rate of the military industry, according to official data, noticeably outpaced the development of industry as a whole. So, if the total volume of industrial production for the second five-year period increased by 120%, then defense - by 286%. During the three pre-war years, this advance was already threefold 5 .
1939-1941 (before the start of the war) were a special period when the foundations of the economic structure of the military-industrial complex (MIC) were fixed. The restructuring of the national economy had a pronounced militaristic character. During these years, a system of defense industry management bodies was formed. General management of the development of mobilization planning in 1938-1941, as well as supervision over the activities of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy, was carried out by the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, whose chairman was I.V. Stalin. The Economic Council of the Council of People's Commissars oversaw the activities of the defense industry. During the war years, all the functions of managing the defense industry were transferred to the State Defense Committee (GKO).
In 1939, the NKOP was divided into specialized defense people's commissariats: weapons, ammunition, aviation, shipbuilding industries. To coordinate the mobilization plan of industry in 1938, an interdepartmental Military-Industrial Commission was created. Military departments - the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy, as well as the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) were the main customers and consumers of military products. A characteristic feature of the period of the first five-year plans was the significant role of the military in the formation of the defense industry, which increased even more in the prewar years. So, from 1938 to 1940. The contingent of military representatives of NGOs at defense industry enterprises increased one and a half times and amounted to 20,281 people. 6
For our study, this period is especially important as the experience of the functioning of the military mobilization model of the Soviet economy, the essential features of which manifested themselves in subsequent stages of the history of the USSR and became the foundation of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Among these features was the subordination of the interests of the civilian consumer to the solution of military tasks. One of the main tasks of the third five-year plan, the government considered strengthening the defense capability of the USSR "on such a scale that would provide a decisive advantage for the USSR in any coalition of attacking capitalist countries." In this regard, according to the third five-year plan, compared with 1937, spending on the national economy as a whole increased by 34.1%, on social and cultural events - by 72.1%, and on defense - by 321.1% . Military spending was to amount to 252 billion rubles, or 30.2% of all state budget expenditures 7 .
A characteristic feature of the Soviet mobilization model was the attraction of funds from the population through the so-called state loans (many of which the state was not going to return). In 1937 was released special loan strengthening the defense of the USSR by 4 billion rubles, however, according to the People's Commissariat of Finance (NKF), the subscription to this loan was even higher - 4916 million rubles. (most of it was in the urban population). As stated in the NKF circular of April 9, 1938, in accordance with the "great growth in current year fund of wages and incomes of the collective-farm village" there were opportunities "in the current year to significantly exceed the amount of the loan" 8 . This practice became an integral feature of the Soviet economic system.
Even sharper shifts towards militarization were outlined in the so-called Special Quarter IV of 1939, when the mobilization plan - MP-1 - for arming the army was put into effect, requiring the restructuring of the entire industry. It provided for the establishment of a list of construction projects, for the development of which funds were allocated in excess of the established limits, and the military departments received priority over civilian consumers. Of the total investment in construction of 5.46 billion rubles. investments in defense construction projects and enterprises amounted to 3.2 billion rubles, i.e. more than half 9 .
Emergency mobilization plans were adopted in 1940-1941. In connection with the introduction mobilization plans military orders were placed at enterprises of all industries, up to factories for the production of children's toys and musical instruments. Often the implementation of these plans required complete change their production profile from civilian to military. At the same time, the process of transferring enterprises from civilian departments to military departments, which later became massive during the war years, began. In total, in 1940 more than 40 enterprises were transferred to the defense departments 10 .
The actual average annual growth rate of defense production for the first two years of the pre-war five-year plan was 143.1%, for three years - 141%, against 127.3% of the average annual rate established by the third five-year plan. The volume of gross output of the people's commissariats of the defense industry increased 2.8 times in three years 11 . An even more strenuous program was planned for 1941. The industrial authorities were obliged to ensure that military orders for aviation, armaments, ammunition, military shipbuilding and tanks were carried out in the first place before all consumers.
In the prewar years, a new military-industrial base began to be created in the east of the country. The idea of developing the eastern regions from the very beginning of its inception was strategically linked to the growth of the country's military potential and the solution of defense tasks. Even before the war, the Urals became a new center of military production, and the development of the Far East began from this point of view. However, a decisive shift in this respect occurred during the war years, which was associated primarily with the occupation or threat of the enemy seizing most of the European territory of the USSR.
During the war period, there was a massive movement of industry to the eastern regions: in total, more than 1,300 enterprises were evacuated and restored in the east, most of which were under the jurisdiction of the defense people's commissariats. For 4/5 they produced military products.
The structure has also changed industrial production, in without fail transferred to meet military needs. According to rough estimates, military consumables accounted for about 65-68% of all industrial output produced in the USSR during the war years 12 . Its main producers were the people's commissariats of the military industry: aviation, weapons, ammunition, mortar weapons, shipbuilding and tank industries. At the same time, other basic branches of heavy industry were also involved in securing military orders: metallurgy, fuel and energy, as well as the People's Commissariats of light and food industries. Thus, the development of the economic structure of the military-industrial complex during the war years was in the nature of total militarization.
During the years of the Great Patriotic War the country has lost three-quarters of its national wealth. The industry was severely destroyed in the territories that were under occupation, and in the rest of the territories it was almost completely transferred to the production of military products. The total population of the USSR decreased from 196 million people. in 1941 to 170 million in 1946, i.e. for 26 million people 13
One of the main tasks in the first post-war years for the USSR was the restoration and further build-up of the country's military-economic base. To solve it in the conditions of economic ruin, it was necessary first of all to find new sources of restoration and development of priority sectors of the national economy. According to official Soviet propaganda, this process was supposed to be calculated on "internal resources", on delivering the country from economic dependence on a hostile capitalist environment.
Meanwhile, this dependence by the end of the war remained very significant. An analysis carried out by Soviet economists of the ratio of imports of the most important types of equipment and materials and their domestic production for 1944 showed that, for example, imports of machine tools amounted to 58%, universal machines - up to 80%, crawler cranes (their domestic industry did not manufacture) - 287%. The situation with non-ferrous metals was similar: lead - 146%, tin - 170%. Particular difficulties arose with the need to develop domestic production goods that were supplied during the war years under Lend-Lease (for many types of raw materials, materials and foodstuffs, the share of these deliveries ranged from 30 to 80%) 14 .
In the early post-war years, one of the most important sources of resources was the export of materials and equipment for the so-called special supplies - trophy, as well as reparations and agreements from Germany, Japan, Korea, Romania, Finland, Hungary. Created at the beginning of 1945, the Commission for the Compensation of Damage Caused by the Nazi Invaders made a general assessment of the human and material losses of the USSR during the war years, developed a plan for the military and economic disarmament of Germany, and discussed the problem of reparations on an international scale.
The Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, as well as special commissions from representatives of economic departments, were engaged in the practical activities for the export of equipment. They compiled lists of enterprises and equipment, laboratories and research institutes that were subject to "withdrawal" and send to the USSR on account of reparations. By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the dismantling and export to the Soviet Union of equipment from Japanese power plants, industrial enterprises and railways located on the territory of Manchuria", the management of this work was entrusted to the authorized Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars M.Z. Saburov. By December 1, 1946, 305 thousand tons of equipment from Manchuria arrived in the USSR total cost US$116.3 million. Altogether, during the two years of the work of the Special Committee, about 1 million wagons of various equipment were exported to the USSR from 4,786 German and Japanese enterprises, including 655 enterprises of the military industry 15 . At the same time, the Soviet side was most interested in German developments in the field of the latest types of weapons of mass destruction.
By the summer of 1946, there were about two million prisoners of war in the USSR - a huge reserve work force. The labor of prisoners of war was widely used in the Soviet national economy (especially in construction) during the years of the first post-war five-year plan. German technical groundwork and the work of specialists were actively used in the initial stages of domestic rocket science, the nuclear project, and in military shipbuilding.
Eastern European countries also played the role of suppliers of strategic raw materials at the early stage of the creation of the nuclear industry in the USSR, especially in 1944-1946. As uranium deposits were explored in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Soviet authorities followed the path of creating joint joint-stock companies for their development under the guise of mining companies. In order to develop the Bukovskoye deposit in Bulgaria, the Soviet-Bulgarian Mining Society was created in early 1945 under the auspices of the NKVD of the USSR 16 . The deposit became the main source of raw materials for the first Soviet reactor.
The countries of the Eastern bloc continued to be the most important source of uranium until the early 1950s. As N.A. Bulganin emphasized in his speech at the “Anti-Beria” Plenum of the Central Committee of July 3, 1953, the state was “well provided with uranium raw materials”, and a lot of uranium was mined on the territory of the GDR - “maybe no less than they have in Americans at their disposal" 17 .
critical resource post-war restoration and building up the economic and defense power of the USSR was the mobilization potential of the centrally planned economy to concentrate forces and means in the most priority areas from the point of view of the country's leadership. One of the traditional levers of forced mobilization was the financial and tax policy of the state. At the end of the war, in the fourth quarter of 1945, the state, it would seem, gave relief to the population, reducing the military tax by 180 million rubles, but at the same time a war loan was organized (subscribed by the peasants) for 400 million rubles. 18 Food prices were raised in September 1946 by 2-2.5 times. In 1948, the size of the agricultural tax increased by 30% compared with 1947, and in 1950 by 2.5 times.
In general, the course taken by the leadership of the USSR for military-economic competition with the West, and above all with the much more economically and technologically advanced United States, was carried out at the cost of considerable hardship for the majority of the country's population. At the same time, it should be noted that the implementation of the Soviet atomic and other programs for the creation of the latest weapons as a whole corresponded in the post-war years to mass moods. Soviet people who were willing to endure hardships and hardships in order to prevent a new war.
One of the resources of economic mobilization was massive forced labor. The NKVD camp system became the basis for the creation of the nuclear and other branches of the military industry. In addition to the labor of imprisoned compatriots, in the late 40s. the labor of prisoners of war was widely used and a system of organized recruitment of labor from various segments of the population was used. A peculiar semi-compulsory form was the work of military builders and specialists, the importance of which especially increased after the abolition of the system of mass camps in the mid-1950s.
In the early post-war years, it was impossible to maintain the size of the armed forces and the size of defense production on a wartime scale, and therefore a number of measures were taken to reduce the military potential. In this regard, two stages are outwardly distinguished in the military-economic policy of the Stalinist leadership: 1945-1948. and late 40s - early 50s. The first was characterized by tendencies towards the demilitarization of the Soviet economy, the reduction of the armed forces and military spending. A real indicator of these trends was the demobilization of the army, carried out in several stages from June 1945 to the beginning of 1949. In general, by the end of 1948 - the beginning of 1949, the Soviet Army was generally reduced from more than 11 million people. up to 2.8 million people twenty
In the first post-war years, the country's leadership also proclaimed a policy of restructuring industry for civilian production. After the reorganization of the management system in May 1945, the number of defense people's commissariats decreased, and military production was concentrated in the people's commissariats for armaments, aviation, shipbuilding, agricultural and transport engineering (in March 1946 they were renamed ministries).
The implementation of the policy of reducing military production and increasing the output of civilian products began already at the end of 1945 and was under the personal control of the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee (after the war - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) L.P. Beria, who concentrated control over heavy industry. However, his instructions on the "conversion" of enterprises to civilian production were rather contradictory. On the one hand, he urged the directors of enterprises in every possible way, who were accustomed to working in emergency military conditions, to drive defense products and experienced great difficulties in switching to civilian production. On the other hand, Beria ordered to maintain and increase the production of a wide range of military products - gunpowder, explosives, chemical munitions, etc. 21
In 1946-1947. the production of a number of types of conventional weapons - tanks and aircraft - was significantly reduced. The heads of the military-industrial departments actively resisted the policy of "conversion": ministers D.F. Ustinov, M.V. Khrunichev, M.G. Pervukhin and others attacked higher authorities, up to Stalin himself, with requests to preserve "unique" military production and on increasing the production of new types of defense products. Attempts to demilitarize industry led to a deterioration in the state of the industrial sector of the economy, already destroyed by the war. Within 6-9 months from the beginning of the restructuring of industry, the output of civilian products only to an insignificant extent compensated for the decline in military production. This led to a decrease in the total volume of production, a deterioration in quality indicators, and a reduction in the number of workers. Only in the second quarter of 1946 did the volume of military output stabilize, while civilian output increased, and a gradual increase in production began.
According to official sources, the post-war restructuring of industry was completed already in 1947, as evidenced by the following figures22:
According to official data, military production in 1940 amounted to 24 billion rubles, in 1944 - 74 billion, in 1945 - 50.5 billion, in 1946 - 14.5 billion, in 1947 the level 1946. However, these figures must be treated with a certain degree of conventionality: they rather show the general dynamics than are reliable in absolute terms, since prices for military products have been falling repeatedly since 1941. 23
The dynamics of military spending of the state budget was as follows: in 1940 - 56.7 billion rubles, in 1944 - 137.7 billion, in 1945 - 128.7 billion, in 1946 - 73.7 billion, in 1947, the level of 1946 was preserved. Thus, even according to official statistics, state spending on military needs by the end of the “conversion” period exceeded the pre-war figures of 1940.
In general, the process of reducing military production mainly affected the rapidly obsolete armaments of the models of the past war, which were not required in the previous quantities. In 1946-1947. the share of civilian and military products has stabilized.
However, as early as 1947, a decrease in plans for the production of civilian products began in a number of ministries of the defense profile (shipbuilding, aviation industry), and from 1949 there was a sharp increase in military orders. During the first post-war five-year plan, the nomenclature of "special products" was almost completely updated, i.e. military products, which paved the way for what began in the 50s. rearmament of the army and navy.
At the end of the 40s. was developed perspective plan production of armored vehicles until 1970. After the failure of the tank production program in 1946-1947, a sharp drop in their output in 1948, starting from 1949, a constant and steady increase in the production of this industry was planned. In connection with the war in Korea, since 1950, the volume of production of aviation equipment has sharply increased 24 .
In general, behind the external "demilitarization" was hiding a new round of the arms race. Already in 1946, the Council of Ministers adopted a number of resolutions on the development of the latest weapons, decisions on developments in the field of jet and radar technology. The construction of warships, mothballed during the war, resumed: a ten-year military shipbuilding program was adopted, and the construction of 40 naval bases was planned. Emergency measures were taken to accelerate the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb.
Along with the traditional defense ministries, emergency bodies were created under the Council of People's Commissars (since March 1946 - the Council of Ministers of the USSR) to manage the new programs: the Special Committee and the First Main Directorate (on the atomic problem), Committee No. 2 (on jet technology), the Committee No. 3 (by radar). The extraordinary, mobilization and experimental nature of these programs has necessitated the concentration of resources of various departments in special supra-ministerial governing bodies.
In general, "demilitarization" was rather a sideline of the post-war restructuring of industry, the main strategic direction of development of which was the development and build-up of the latest types of weapons. Plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1951-1955. for the military and special industries provided for a significant, from year to year increasing volume of deliveries of all types military equipment, and special attention was paid to the preparation of capacities for the production of new types of military equipment and strategic raw materials, the replenishment of special production capacity switched after the end of the war to other branches of the national economy.
For six defense-industrial ministries (aeronautical industry, armaments, agricultural engineering, transport engineering, communications industry, auto-tractor industry), the average output of military products over the five-year period was to increase by 2.5 times. However, for some types of military equipment, a significantly greater growth was planned: for radar and armored vehicles - by 4.5 times. On a larger scale, the production of atomic "products" increased, which was planned separately even from all other types of military products. To eliminate "bottlenecks" and disproportions in the national economy and to create new branches for the production of weapons - jet technology and radar equipment - the plan outlined the volume of capital investments in the main branches of the defense industry in the amount of 27,892 million rubles.
Moreover, in the early 1950s this plan has been repeatedly adjusted upwards. In March 1952, the size of capital investments in the military and defense-industrial departments was noticeably increased. Arbitrary adjustment of plans in general was a characteristic feature of the Soviet planning system. Another long-term trend, with the exception of certain periods, was the predominant growth of investments in the defense sector compared to other industries. During the period under review, a kind of military-industrial revolution began in the country, accompanied by a sharp increase in military spending, the expansion of defense programs and the simultaneous strengthening of the influence of the professional military elite on the decision-making process on defense issues. From the beginning of the 1950s increased production plans various kinds conventional weapons of modernized models - tanks, self-propelled guns, aircraft; forced rearmament of the army began.
According to official data, the strength of the USSR Armed Forces increased in the early 1950s. up to almost 6 million people. According to recently declassified information from the archives, the quantitative composition of the central apparatus of the War Ministry as of September 1, 1952 increased by 242% compared to the pre-war figure - as of January 1, 1941: 23,075 people. against 9525 25 . The unwinding of a new spiral of arms race and confrontation was partly due to the aggravation of the international situation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. (Berlin crisis, the creation of NATO, the war in Korea, etc.), partly with the strengthening of the role of the military machine in the life of Soviet society and the state.
In spite of new growth military programs of the USSR in the early 1950s, by this time the military-industrial complex had not yet gained the political weight that would allow it to decisively influence the policy of the Soviet leadership. In 1953-1954. a steady course towards the deployment of a military confrontation with the West gave way to a controversial period in economic and military policy. 1954-1958 became a rare period in Soviet history of a decrease in military spending and an increase in the share of the consumption sector in the gross national product.
In contrast to the growth of military programs in the preceding 1950-1952, the second half of 1953 and 1954 were already marked by some shift towards civilian production and consumerism. For example, the plan for survey and design work for the Military Ministry for 1953 initially amounted to 43225 million rubles, and then was reduced to 40049 million, i.e. more than 3 million rubles. The plan for the military and special industries for 1954 was also adjusted downward: the growth in production in 1954 compared to 1953, instead of 107% according to the plan and 108.8% at the request of the War Ministry, was reduced to 106.9 %.
When evaluating the dynamics of the gross national product, one should take into account the 5% reduction in wholesale prices for military products from January 1, 1953, as well as the growth in the output of civilian products. The decline in the gross output of a number of ministries in 1953 and according to the draft plan for 1954 was also explained by a decrease in the output of defense products and an increase in the output of consumer goods, which had lower wholesale prices. In general, the output of consumer goods in 1953 and 1954 significantly exceeded the volume of production provided for these years according to the five-year plan for 1951-1955. 26
The trend towards a reduction in military spending continued in subsequent years, when the influence of N.S. Khrushchev in the top leadership increased, until the establishment of his autocracy in the summer of 1957. The military spending of the USSR was reduced by a total of one billion rubles. By the middle of 1957, the size of the army and navy had decreased by 1.2 million people. - up to about 3 million people. - due to the program announced by Khrushchev to reduce the traditional types of the Armed Forces (in particular, this concerned Stalin's plans for the deployment of conventional naval forces and weapons) and a shift in priorities towards missiles, electronics and nuclear weapons.
According to some Western estimates, during the first three years of Khrushchev's rule, the share of military spending in the country's gross national product (GNP) decreased from 12% to 9%, while the share of the consumption sector increased from 60% to 62% 27 . In 1959, the growth in the cost of manufacturing the latest weapons reversed this trend, and the military spending of the USSR again increased to the level of 1955, although due to the rapid growth of the gross national product during this period, the percentage of military spending in GNP remained the same. After 1959, their share in GNP began to slowly but steadily increase. Military spending again took a priority place in the economic policy of the Soviet leadership. According to Western estimates, in the time interval from 1952 to 1970. 1961-1965 became the period of the highest growth rates in the USSR's military expenditures, when their average growth rates reached 7.6% 28 .
At the same time, the lion's share of military spending was precisely the cost of the production and operation of the latest weapons and their systems, and not the maintenance of troops. This trend of predominant growth in the cost of military equipment developed more and more noticeably in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution.
The period of the late 1950s - early 1960s. characterized by the search for new principles for organizing the management of the national economy of the USSR, including the defense industry. By the time of the reorganization of the management of the national economy undertaken by N.S. Khrushchev in 1957-1958. the main armaments production programs were concentrated in the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (atomic program), the Ministry of Defense Industry (renamed in 1953 from the Ministry of Armaments), the Ministry of Radio Engineering Industry (created in 1954), as well as in the Ministries of Aviation and Shipbuilding Industry. As is known, in the late 1950s the system of sectoral ministries was abolished, and defense industry enterprises, like other sectors of the economy, were transferred to the jurisdiction of local economic councils. To organize research and development work on the creation of weapons, the State Committees for aviation technology, on defense technology, on shipbuilding and radio electronics, on the use of atomic energy.
On the whole, Khrushchev's reform led to a well-known decentralization and the establishment of links between defense and civilian enterprises, the expansion of the geographical and social boundaries of the Soviet military-industrial complex. According to N.S.Simonov, enterprises for serial production of defense products were included in the system of regional economic relations, leaving the state of production and technological isolation. local authorities economic management were able to place orders for them that met local needs. Enterprises of the military-industrial complex (DIC) even began to show a tendency towards economic independence, which was manifested in the establishment of real contractual relations with the customer - the Ministry of Defense - in matters of pricing 29 .
At the same time, in the context of decentralization of defense industry management, the coordinating role of the most important state body at the supra-ministerial level, recreated in the late 1950s, increased. Military Industrial Commission under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. It was headed in turn by the largest leaders of the Soviet military-industrial complex D.F. Ustinov, V.M. Ryabikov, L.N. Smirnov. The commission became the main governing body of the defense industry in the period of the 1960s - 1980s.
The return to the ministerial system after the dismissal of N.S. Khrushchev at the end of 1964 contributed to the strengthening of the centralized planning principle in the management of the defense industry. Another “gathering” of military enterprises into centralized sectoral ministries began. In particular, in 1965, the Ministry of General Machine Building was created, which concentrated work on rocket and space technology (previously, these developments were scattered among the enterprises of a number of ministries). As a result of the reform of 1965, the so-called "nine" defense-industrial ministries were finally formed, in which military production was mainly concentrated (Ministries of the aviation industry, defense industry, general engineering, radio industry, medium engineering, shipbuilding industry, chemical industry, electronic industry, electrical industry). They were joined by 10 allied ministries, which were also engaged in the production of military and civilian products.
The economic structure of the military-industrial complex was in fact the supporting structure of the entire socio-economic system of the USSR. As of the end of the 1980s, defense industry enterprises produced 20-25% of the gross domestic product (GDP), absorbing the lion's share of the country's resources. The best scientific and technical developments and personnel were concentrated in the defense industry: up to 3/4 of all research and development work (R&D) was carried out in the defense industry. The enterprises of the defense complex produced most of the civilian electrical products: 90% of televisions, refrigerators, radios, 50% of vacuum cleaners, motorcycles, electric stoves. About Uz of the country's population lived in the area where the OPK enterprises were located 30 . All this, at the same time, led to an excessive inflating of the zone of "unproductive" expenditures on the production of weapons to the detriment of the sphere of consumption.
The Soviet military-industrial complex became the most important supplier of weapons for the countries of the "third world" and the "socialist camp". In the early 1980s 25% of weapons and military equipment produced in the USSR were exported abroad. The size of military supplies for many years was considered highly classified information, which was partially open to Russian public only in the early 1990s. During the post-war period, the USSR participated in armed conflicts and wars in more than 15 countries (by sending military specialists and contingents, as well as by supplying weapons and military equipment in order to provide "international assistance"), including 31:
| Country | Period of conflict | Debt of the respective country before the USSR (billion dollars) |
| North Korea | June 1950 - July 1953 | 2,2 |
| Laos | 1960-1963 August 1964 - November 1968 November 1969 - December 1970 | 0,8 |
| Egypt | October 18, 1962 – April 1, 1974 | 1,7 |
| Algeria | 1962-1964 | 2,5 |
| Yemen | October 18, 1962 – April 1, 1963 | 1,0 |
| Vietnam | July 1, 1965 – December 31, 1974 | 9,1 |
| Syria | June 5-13, 1967 October 6-24, 1973 | 6,7 |
| Cambodia | April 1970 - December 1970 | 0,7 |
| Bangladesh | 1972-1973 | 0,1 |
| Angola | November 1975 - 1979 | 2,0 |
| Mozambique | 1967 - 1969 November 1975 - November 1979 | 0,8 |
| Ethiopia | December 9, 1977 – November 30, 1979 | 2,8 |
| Afghanistan | April 1978 - May 1991 | 3,0 |
| Nicaragua | 1980 - 1990 | 1,0 |
In general, by the beginning of the 1980s. The USSR became the world's first supplier of weapons (in terms of supply), ahead of even the United States in this respect. The Soviet military-industrial complex went beyond the boundaries of one state, becoming the most important force in the world economy and international relations. At the same time, it became an increasingly heavy burden on the country's economy and an obstacle to raising the standard of living of the Soviet people.
1 For more details, see: Simonov N.S. Military-industrial complex of the USSR in the 1920-1950s: economic growth rates, structure, organization of production and management. M., 1996. Ch. 2; Mukhin M.Yu. The evolution of the management system of the Soviet defense industry in 1921-1941 and the change in the priorities of the "defense industry" // Otechestvennaya istoriya. 2000. No. 3. S. 3-15. On the structure of the defense industry in the late 20s - early 30s. see also: Russian State Archive of Economics (hereinafter - RGAE). F. 3429. Op. 16.
2 See: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 36. D. 164.
3 See: ibid. D. 186. L. 107.
4 Ibid. F. 3429. Op. 16. D. 179. L. 238.
5 See: Lagovsky A. Economy and military power of the state // Krasnaya Zvezda. 1969. October 25.
6 Simonov N.S. Decree. op. S. 132.
7 RGAE. F. 4372. Op. 92. D. 173. L. 115.
8 Ibid. F. 7733. Op. 36. D. 67. L. 45.
9 See: ibid. D. 158. L. 29-34.
10 Ibid. D. 310. L. 37.
11 Ibid. F. 4372. Op. 92. D. 265. L. 4.
12 Simonov N.S. Decree. op. S. 152.
13 See: The USSR and the Cold War / Ed. V.S. Lelchuk, E.I. Pivovar. M „ 1995. S. 146.
14 Based on documents from the RGAE funds.
15 For more details, see: State Archives Russian Federation(hereinafter - GA RF). F. 5446. Op. 52. D. 2. L. 45-116.
16 See: GA RF. F. 9401. On. 1. D. 92. L. 166-174.
17 See: Case of Beria // Izv. Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 169-170.
18 See: RGAE. F. 1562. Op. 329. D. 2261. L. 21-22.
19 The USSR and the Cold War. S. 156.
20 See: Evangelista M. Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised // Soviet Military Policy Since World War II / Ed. by W.T.Lee, KF.Staar. Stanford, 1986. P. 281-311.
21 For more details, see: Postwar Conversion: On the History of the Cold War, Ed. ed. V.SLelchuk. M., 1998.
22 See: GA RF. F. 5446. Op. 5. D. 2162. L. 176.
23 See: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 36. D. 687.
24 For more details, see: Bystrova I.V. Development of the military-industrial complex // USSR and cold war. pp. 176-179.
25 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 164. D. 710. L. 31.
26 According to the RGAE documents.
27 See: Soviet Military Policy... P. 21-22.
28 See: Bezborodov A.B. Power and the military-industrial complex in the USSR in the mid-40s - mid-70s // Soviet society: weekdays of the cold war. M.; Arzamas, 2000, p. 108.
29 See: Simonov N.S. Decree. op. pp. 288-291.
30 See: Zaleschansky B. Restructuring of military-industrial complex enterprises: from conservatism to adequacy // Chelovek i trud. 1998. No. 2. S. 80-83.
31 Red star. 1991. May 21.
Alexander Uralov.
Malyshev Vyacheslav Alexandrovich People's Commissar of Heavy Engineering (1939-1940), People's Commissar of Medium Engineering (1940-1941), Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (1940-1944), People's Commissar of Tank Industry (1941-1942, 1943-1945), Hero Socialist Labor, laureate of the Stalin Prizes, Colonel General of the Tank Engineering Service.
“He was a very organized, disciplined person, a little tough, rather demanding. He knew how to work when it was necessary to have time to do an incredible amount. He had a colossal organizational talent, which helped him head several ministries at once. And plus everything, God, or something, it was given to him, he understood all the innovations of science and technology.
V.S. Sumin. Assistant to V.A. Malyshev, who worked with him for 17 years.
Legendary Commissar of War
Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Malyshev was a talented design engineer and a major head of industrial production. He started his career at railway machinist. He received his engineering education at the Moscow Higher Technical School (MVTU named after Bauman), from which he graduated in 1934. His thesis defense turned into a creative interview of a mature engineer V.A. Malyshev with the examiners. From his teacher A.N. Shelest, a member of the state examination committee, who also graduated from the Higher Imperial Technical School (as it was called before the revolution, MVTU), the diploma student heard the flattering: “Yes, this is a born director!” And he became one already in May 1938, at the age of thirty-six, when, at the request of the People's Commissar of Mechanical Engineering A.D. Bruskin, he was appointed director of the plant. Kuibyshev. Vyacheslav Alexandrovich delved into every little thing, he was constantly in production shops and, if necessary, strictly asked for omissions. But the people were not offended by Malyshev, because in the first place he did not spare himself.
As People's Commissar for Heavy Engineering, Malyshev devoted most of his energy to the production of tanks. He managed to evacuate to the Urals the main production base for the production of tanks from Leningrad (Kirov and Severny plants), as well as plants from Stalingrad, Kharkov and Moscow. Thanks to his vivacious energy and pressure, some factories from other industries were also switched to the production of tanks, including the Krasnoye Sormovo shipbuilding plant in the city of Gorky.
In 1943 V.A. Malyshev, by a decree of the State Defense Committee, was appointed People's Commissar of the tank industry.
A man of seething energy, he was constantly on the "battlefield" - in the shops, at the training grounds, at the front. And with his energy, like a torch, he kindled the hearts of workers and engineers, forcing - for the sake of the front, for the sake of Victory - to work at the limit of human capabilities. He spared himself least of all - and the tank factories fulfilled and overfulfilled the plan. After all, the front needed tanks.
V.A. Malyshev often visited the fronts, in the troops defending Stalingrad. At the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, which produces tanks, together with their deputy Goreglyad, they were literally at the forefront - in front of their eyes, German tanks, attacking, almost broke through our defenses. The situation has become critical. Then, straight from the assembly shop, clanking caterpillars, not yet painted, scary, factory tanks went into battle - everything that could move and shoot. Over 50 machines under the command of a plant process engineer. “We didn’t see anything like this,” Paulus’s adjutant, Colonel V. Adam, later recalled. - General Wittersheim offered the commander of the 6th Army to move away from the Volga. He did not believe that this gigantic city could be taken."
T-34 is a legend of the Second World War.
So fought at the head of the country's tank builders, the commander of the tank industry, Colonel-General of the Engineering and Technical Service V.A. Malyshev. It was under his leadership that a tank armada consisting of 86,000 tanks and 23,000 self-propelled artillery mounts went on a strategic offensive on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Steel warriors T-34, KV, IS, as well as SAU-76 and 85, SU-100, SAU-122 mm, SAU-152, called St. John's wort, became the heroes of many decisive battles. Member of the State Defense Committee A.I. Mikoyan characterized the Stalinist People's Commissar as follows:
“I met him when he became People's Commissar and Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. I especially liked it during the war. It was a pleasure for me to look at him, with what a twinkle he worked, becoming the people's commissar of the tank industry. He was not only a knowledgeable engineer, but also a great organizer, and engineering and organizational activity is very important in our conditions. There are many good engineers, but there are few major organizers-engineers, even very few. This is not only because of his experience, but also his personal talent.
At the end of the war, we all became convinced of what a talented organizer Malyshev was, what a fiery leader who knew how to gather talented people around him and fulfill what was entrusted to him. And it is no coincidence that when the question arose of creating a nuclear industry in the USSR, it was Malyshev who was sent as the head of the newly created industry.
Among all the people's commissars, Malyshev was most often called to the Kremlin and to the dacha in Kuntsevo to resolve the most important issues of the defense industry. From 1939 to 1950, he spoke with Stalin over 100 times, and most of these meetings took place during the war. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief highly valued him as an outstanding organizer of industry.
A brilliant leader with deep engineering knowledge, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich was one of the outstanding organizers of the development of the tank industry during the war years.
From left to right: D.F.Ustinov, B.L.Vannikov, A.I.Efremov, V.A.Malyshev, 1943
Industry in a short time was reorganized on a military basis, began to give the front good combat vehicles.
The famous commanders of the Great Patriotic War treated Malyshev with the greatest respect: G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, K. K. Rokossovsky, I. S. Konev, A. I. Eremenko, marshals and generals of the armored forces Ya. Fedorenko, P. A. Rotmistrov, P. S. Rybalko.
Army General Twice Hero Soviet Union, candidate of military sciences D. D. Lelyushenko during World War II commanded combined arms and tank armies, was deputy head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army. In his notes, he writes: “In those days, I often met with Vyacheslav Alexandrovich Malyshev, who led the tank industry. He was struck by his seething energy. Being a very busy man, Malyshev did not miss the opportunity to meet and talk with tankers, patiently listened to their complaints and remarks. He often visited the front-line training grounds where new vehicles were tested. He escorted formed tank formations to the active army. You could call him late at night or early in the morning - Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich was always "at home". He did not have the habit of postponing decisions. Work with such a person was pleasant and easy.
Lieutenant General technical troops, Hero of Socialist Labor F.F. Petrov in his memoirs emphasizes the exceptional organizational talent of Malyshev, who rallied everyone - from armor masters, engine creators to cannon designers.
Work in the uranium project.
Even during the Great Patriotic War, information appeared about work with uranium-235. Malyshev became interested in this problem.
The Americans did not think that we could make an atomic bomb so quickly. Immediately after the war, on July 17, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference of the victorious powers, American President G. Truman informed I.V. Stalin that the United States had powerful weapons, thereby, according to the observation of Marshal G.K. , leaving him astonished. John F. Hogerton and Ellsworth Raymond in the book "When will Russia have an atomic bomb?", published in 1948 in Moscow, predicted that the USSR would be able to create an atomic bomb only in 1954. As you know, they got into a mess with the forecast.
Even during the Great Patriotic War, Soviet scientists dealt with the uranium problem. In December 1946, I.V. Kurchatov and his collaborators built the first reactor in Europe and carried out a chain reaction, and in 1948 they launched the first industrial uranium-graphite reactor.
The start-up of these reactors and the production of negligible microgram amounts of plutonium at the first of them, and industrial quantities at the second, summed up the enormous efforts of geologists, miners, metallurgists and metallurgists, chemists and radiochemists, graphite scientists, designers and experimental physicists. As early as August 1949, the Soviet Union tested an atomic bomb. With the creation of atomic weapons, the development of nuclear energy began.
Test of the first atomic bomb of the USSR. August 29, 1949
He was the head of the State Commission for testing the first thermonuclear bomb, conducted at the Semipalatinsk test site on August 12, 1953. A.D. Sakharov recalled: "Malyshev hugged me and immediately suggested that, together with other test leaders, we go to the field" to see what happened. overalls with dosimeters in breast pockets... The cars drove on and stopped a few tens of meters from the remnants of the test tower... Malyshev got out of the car and went to the tower. I sat next to him and got out too. The rest remained in the car. Only the concrete foundations of the supports remained from the tower ... Half a minute later we returned to the cars ... "As it later became known, everyone who visited the epicenter of the explosion at that time received very large, life-threatening doses of radiation.
On August 12, 1953, the world's first hydrogen bomb was tested in the USSR. The test took place at the Semipalatinsk test site. The blast wave destroyed everything within a radius of 4 kilometers.
The role of Malyshev, as the largest machine builder, in the uranium project is obvious. I.V. Kurchatov spoke about his merits more than once, noting that Malyshev managed to mobilize hundreds of factories, mines, design bureaus (including former tank ones, from where N.L. Dukhov came to the nuclear industry - in Arzamas-16 he headed a special design bureau sector engaged in the development of the atomic bomb) to work on the Atomic Project. With the participation of Malyshev, construction began nuclear power plant in Obninsk, launched in June 1954, and the construction of the nuclear icebreaker "Lenin" (chief designer V.I. Neganov, scientific supervisor of the creation of a nuclear power plant, academician A.P. Aleksandrov), which involved up to 500 plants of the Soviet Union. Its creation has turned into another giant experimental site new technology, has become a maturity test for metallurgists, machine builders, assemblers. Heading the Ministry of Shipbuilding of the USSR, V.A. Malyshev was one of the initiators and organizer of the work on the creation of the nuclear submarine fleet of the USSR.
However nuclear icebreaker"Lenin", the beginning of the construction of which was laid by Malyshev, he did not happen to see on the roadstead. Until that day, he did not live for several months. And he did not live to see the launch of the first artificial Earth satellite. But there is also his share of labor in the rapid pace of development of Soviet rocket and space technology.
I.V. Stalin called V.A. Malyshev the chief engineer of the country. Malyshev was a demanding person, he liked to understand everything thoroughly, he loved everything new. He was present at all the tests of weapons, equipment, it was important for him to understand everything, to see, to study the ongoing processes. He was a very meticulous, scrupulous person. Despite the prohibitions, immediately after the test of the atomic bomb, I went to the epicenter of the explosion. He wanted to see everything for himself, almost to feel it. It was his fearlessness, dedication to the matter that led to the fact that he "grabbed" a dose of radiation and died early, at only 54 years old ...
The creation and organization of the nuclear industry is a matter for which he took up with enthusiasm. When scientists completed their developments, and they needed to be introduced into production, Malyshev attracted his tank designers, as well as machine-building, tank factories.
The working day of Vyacheslav Alexandrovich lasted a long time: from early morning and often until one in the morning. Almost every day he was in the government. And then - analytical work. We have prepared reviews foreign literature on technical issues for him. He got acquainted with what is happening in the world through reviews, translations. He was interested in all the information related to the issues of the defense complex. I remember how, before going to a scientific symposium in England, he wrote all notebook information about this country. Extracts were made from a variety of literature. The result was a kind of "encyclopedia" about England. Everything was there: history, economic development, the state of the defense industry, culture. I still have this notebook, scribbled by his hand. Now I keep it as a memory of this man.
He was a very dynamic person. One of the English newspapers, after his trip to the conference, wrote that this was a "dynamo man." While in England, he traveled to factories and enterprises. All this was close, familiar to him, like home. He liked to visit factories. This was more important to him than any paper report.
V.A. Malyshev visited all the facilities, nuclear submarines. He was praised in the government for building up the atomic fleet so quickly. Instead of rivets, he introduced automatic welding. He taught some specialists to be bolder, reproached that they were afraid of the new. Often communicated with academician Paton Evgeny Oskarovich.
In 1946, Malyshev, analyzing the results of the war, concluded that "during the years of the war, our tank industry has covered a path in the field of introducing equipment and technology that would have taken 10-15 years before the war." Despite the difficulties of the war, hundreds and thousands of enterprises were transferred to the East. The government was able to allocate a sufficient amount of new equipment to tank factories, which ensured the creation of a base for the mass production of tanks.
As an outstanding organizer of industry, I.V. highly appreciated him. Stalin. During the war, Malyshev was summoned 107 times to Stalin's office to resolve the most important issues of the defense industry. Only some members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and none of the people's commissars who were not members of the Politburo were called more often.
Creation of the transport industry.
In October 1945, the People's Commissariat of Tank Industry was abolished and the People's Commissariat of Transport Engineering headed by V. A. Malyshev was created on its basis.
The new case was incredibly difficult. After four years of war, transport engineering plants were in a difficult situation, many were switched to the production of military equipment. And the tasks are huge. During the five-year period (1946-1950), the People's Commissariat of Transport Engineering is to produce 6,165 mainline steam locomotives, 865 diesel locomotives, and 435,000 wagons. In addition, the enterprises of the Ministry should provide 74.5 thousand tractors, 79 thousand diesel engines, and revive the production of river vessels at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant.
How to make this jump? Malyshev is looking for ways. Experience suggested: only through new maneuvers with the available capacities and, above all, decisive switching of tank, armored hull, diesel plants to new types of products.
Malyshev sought not only to restore the production of peaceful products and the organization of production, focusing on pre-war models, but to create a new mass production focused on modern types of machines.
Malyshev laid the foundation for post-war transport engineering on the principles of mass-flow technology. New aggregate plants are being built, the plants of the former tank industry with their powerful base are becoming subcontractors of transport engineering enterprises. New designs of steam locomotives, diesel locomotives, diesel engines, and tractors are being created.
Creation and application of new technology.
In December 1947, the State Planning Committee of the USSR was reorganized and the State Committee for the Supply of the National Economy of the USSR and the State Committee for the Introduction of New Equipment in the National Economy (Gostekhnika USSR) were formed. Gostekhnika was entrusted with the task of speeding up the introduction of new technology into the national economy for the purpose of further rapid technical equipment and re-equipment of the national economy.
V. A. Malyshev was appointed Chairman of the State Engineering Committee. In the life of Malyshev, who these days is forty years old, a very special period begins. There was a transformation of him into one of the strategists of the national economy, into the true chief engineer of the country (as many industrial workers called Malyshev). In this position, his integrity, engineering talent and organizational thought received the most complete expression. He believed that the main thing is the struggle not for individual innovations, not for private improvements that make temporary success, but the struggle for historically progressive trends in science and technology.
Malyshev focuses on the problem of speedy mechanization of labor-intensive and heavy work in the main branches of industry and construction. This ensured the creation of a reserve of labor and gain time.
State Engineering most fully revealed the organizational role in the construction of the Volga-Don Canal (1950-1952).
Unlike the original canal construction project, which provided for the involvement of more than 500 thousand people, the proposal of Malyshev and Gostekhnika provided for only 200 thousand people, but with the creation and commissioning of powerful earth-moving equipment. Walking excavators, scrapers, powerful dump trucks, tractors are being created.
New construction - new equipment. This was a truly Malyshevian scale, a case that stirred up dozens of factories and ministries. Volgo-Don became a laboratory for new technology.
Everything was done in two and a half years instead of five. On May 31, 1952, the waters of two great rivers merged forever.
Ministry of the shipbuilding industry.
On January 10, 1950, by order of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Malyshev undertakes to accept the affairs of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry within seven days. A day later, the corresponding Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR appeared. This is the third ministry in five years.
Malyshev knew that the large fleet program was adopted even before the war, when the People's Commissariat of the Navy and the People's Commissariat of Shipbuilding were created. In 1938-1940, many large warships were laid down. But they remained on the slipways unfinished.
There is very little time to be a large fleet. Meanwhile, the construction of one ship stretched out for three or four years, with huge expenditures of manual labor. Malyshev travels to shipyards. He realized that it was necessary to break the outdated technology for assembling ships. Some innovations began to be introduced before him, but innovations had to be introduced more boldly. The Ministry is working on this. Shipyards in the 50s changed their traditional look. "Slipway time" was drastically reduced, most of the assembly work was transferred to the shop. The delivery program of 1950 was successfully completed. In January 1951, I. V. Stalin called Malyshev and congratulated him on the successful completion of the plan for the delivery of ships.
The world's first nuclear-powered icebreaker "V.I. Lenin".
Old shipbuilders, designers noted that it was not only interesting to work with Malyshev. The lessons of working with Malyshev are the lessons of the most efficient, flexible mastering of the new, the elimination of inertia, the constant development of a sense of the new.
The disease - acute leukemia - crept imperceptibly and progressed rapidly. Intensive treatment, the extraordinary personal courage of Malyshev himself, the care of friends - everything turned out to be powerless. On February 20, 1957, death occurred. On February 22, a farewell took place in the Hall of Columns of the House of Soviets. The urn with the ashes was buried in the Kremlin wall. The Kharkov Machine-Building Plant, streets in Moscow, Kolomna and Syktyvkar (a monument was erected in the city) and in other cities were named after him.
Where have such people gone? They were replaced in government posts by demagogues who built their careers by participating in various kinds of political squabbles, technically illiterate, but, nevertheless, undertaking to solve something in matters completely unknown to them and incomprehensible - the results of their activities are already obvious even to people who are the most distant from technical topics.
So, for example, a physics teacher by education, owner of a car dealership, head of the election headquarters of Petro Poroshenko in the Kherson region, deputy of the regional council 42 -year-old Roman Romanov.
This teacher-physicist in 1995 graduated from the physics and mathematics department of the Kherson State Pedagogical Institute. N.K. Krupskaya (a very prestigious university!) being an entrepreneur since 1992. When did he study?
“... He had a colossal organizational talent, which helped him head several ministries at once. And plus everything, God, or something, it was given to him, he understood all the innovations of science and technology. This is V.A. Malyshev.
How is it with I. Stalin: “Cadres decide everything!”
And what talent does a deputy of the regional council, an entrepreneur, the owner of a car dealership in Kherson, applicable to the management of such a colossus as the state concern Ukroboronprom?
Goodbye, Ukroboronprom Group of Companies!
- Login or register to post comments
- 2051 views
- print version
Before becoming Deputy Minister of Mechanical Engineering and Defense Industry of the USSR in 1980-1991, Nikolai Puzyrev worked for 14 years at the Yakov Sverdlov Plant in the city of Dzerzhinsk, Gorky (now Nizhny Novgorod) Region. The role of this plant in ensuring the country's defense capability has been and remains high. Suffice it to say that the enterprise during the Great Patriotic War produced 25 percent of all ammunition supplied to the Red Army. Here Puzyrev went from master technologist to deputy chief engineer, so almost everyone knows about these products.
- What is the role of ammunition in solving military problems?
- It would not be an exaggeration to say that all types of weapons - guns, tanks, aircraft, ships without ammunition remain just beautiful targets for the enemy. After all, the target hits the ammunition, and the rest of the weapons are just a means of delivering it. In no case do I belittle the role of weapons, but even ultra-modern models can only complete the task with the use of weapons. My philosophy is as follows: weapons and ammunition are a single whole and the absence or lack of one negates the value of the other.
“No private trader can ever be compared with a public leader, because he is motivated only by his own interest and profit”
The entire course of the Great Patriotic War speaks of the invaluable role of ammunition. In 1941, the Red Army had all the necessary weapons, but there was not enough ammunition - the Germans bombed the warehouses in the first days of the war, 40 percent of the factories fell into the zone of occupation. We had nothing to shoot with - no cartridges, no shells. For example, only three shells per day relied on a cannon. This is how we started the war.
Each munitions plant produced products almost until the very arrival of the Germans, and only three days before the expected occupation, the equipment was completely dismantled, loaded into trains and sent to the Urals or further along with the workers and their families. Everything that could not be loaded and taken out was blown up on the spot. And there was no case that the Germans were able to use our factories for their intended purpose. They got empty production buildings or even ruins.
But in the first half of 1943, the industry already provided the army with the necessary amount of ammunition. It is from this moment that the turning point in the war begins, and then the path to Victory. By the way, in order to understand the role of ammunition, you need to know that during the war, 50 percent of the metal went into their manufacture. By 1944-1945, we not only fully satisfied the needs of the army in the field, but were also able to create stocks in the warehouses of the Far East and Transbaikalia to quickly defeat Japan.
– What did the industry look like at the peak of Soviet power?
– This period was the most significant in the development of the industry. The tense situation, the likelihood of a military conflict forced the state leadership to pay special attention to it. And after the war, it carefully studied the experience of military operations and, realizing the importance of the industry, decided to modernize it. Research institutes (NIIs) began to be created on the basis of factories. There were 15 of them, and before the war there were only five. At the same time, four test sites were built to test almost all types of ammunition and weapons. The polygons have survived to this day. Also Soviet government founded four design institutes, where work was carried out in the interests of research institutes and enterprises. Institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences were involved in fundamental research in the field of high-energy materials, explosion physics, combustion processes of gunpowder and solid rocket propellants. Now these institutions practically do not work for the defense industry.
As a result of the purposeful policy of the party and government, the level of military equipment has rapidly increased. Thus, in the post-war period up to 1985, we managed to upgrade the entire ammunition load of the army and navy three or four times. We have created such a military potential that the armies of the rest of the world have found themselves in the role of catching up. At that time, Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov was at the helm of the defense complex.
By the 1990s, our industry had achieved impressive results. Highly mechanized and automated lines for the production of shells of all types of ammunition, explosive devices, equipment and product assembly were created and mastered. In especially dangerous chemical industries, that is, explosives, gunpowder, solid rocket fuel, pyrotechnic compositions, remote-controlled workshops appeared, technological process and the complete withdrawal of people from dangerous areas. In our Research Institute of Dzerzhinsk, an automation department was allocated for the development and manufacture of automatic control systems (ACS) and a pilot plant for the manufacture of ACS was built.
Of course, the search for a management model for the industry was not easy. After 1946, enterprises changed their departmental affiliation many times along the following chain: the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering - the Ministry of Defense Industry - the newly created Ministry of General Engineering - the Ministry of Defense Industry - economic councils - again the Ministry of Defense Industry. In November 1967, a special government body for the production of ammunition, the USSR Ministry of Mechanical Engineering, appeared. The Council of Ministers, by its creation, emphasized the exceptional importance of work in the field of ammunition on a modern scientific basis.
Vyacheslav Vasilievich Bakhirev was appointed head of the new department. He graduated from Moscow State University in 1941, went from a design engineer to the director of the Kovrov Plant No. 2 named after V. A. Degtyarev, and in 1965-1967 he worked as First Deputy Minister of Defense Industry of the USSR. It is thanks to his talent, high responsibility for the assigned work and understanding of the national importance of ammunition for the country's defense capability that our industry has been recognized as one of the most important, determining the might of the Motherland.
As for me, for six years I was the director of a large plant in Chapaevsk for the production of explosives and equipment of ammunition. Then I was appointed head of the main department of the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering for the production of explosives, equipment and ammunition assembly. In this capacity, he oversaw 18 factories and three research institutes. And when I became deputy minister, I already had 30 factories and five research institutes in my charge.
- Now it is often argued that a private owner is more efficient than a state director. Do you agree with this statement?
– Not a single private trader can ever be compared with a state leader, because he is motivated only by his own interest and benefit. And the state set a task before us, which we simply had no right not to solve. We had a huge burden of responsibility to the country. Especially in such an important industry as ammunition, on which the defense capability of the state depends. Not a single leader, even if he was seven spans in his forehead, could solve huge tasks alone. But then the most powerful Soviet party-state system operated, all issues were resolved comprehensively. As a factory director, I relied on state and party bodies. Everything worked like clockwork, clearly and smoothly.
In addition, the director of a Soviet enterprise had to be responsible for social issues no less, and even more than for production. We resettled people in solid houses from barracks built during the war during the evacuation of defense plants from west to east and the construction of new defense enterprises, provided kindergartens. In the 1970s, the problem of kindergartens was completely solved. Due to the construction of new schools, one-shift studies were made. Pioneer camps, sanatoriums, gyms and stadiums appeared at almost all factories. The entire social sphere lay on the leader. Thus, the volume of duties of the Soviet director was immeasurably greater than any current top manager, and we coped.
- There is an opinion that the military-industrial complex lay a ruinous burden on the country's economy. What do you think?
- Not everyone knows that military-industrial complex enterprises were engaged in the production of civilian products in huge volumes. There was an iron rule - for one ruble of salary, an enterprise should produce consumer goods (consumer goods) for at least one ruble. That is, the wages of the workers of the complex were fully covered by civilian production. Almost a million people worked in our industry. For one ruble of wages, we produced 1.6 rubles of consumer goods. Taking into account the fact that the salary in the military-industrial complex was higher than the national average, you can imagine how huge volumes we created civilian products, and the highest, often world-class ones at that.
- How do you feel about the ever-increasing purchases of military equipment abroad?
- Another iron rule of Soviet gunsmiths was: it is forbidden to buy ammunition and equipment for industry from foreigners. Each plant had a workshop for non-standard equipment, which employed about 500 people. Everything was designed and built there. technological equipment. I think this is the wisest decision. After all, the import of technologies for the defense industry leads to dependence, fraught with dangerous consequences. Russian products are not compatible with NATO calibers, which means that we will have to purchase all weapons from our sworn friends, who, in the event of a conflict, will not hesitate to stop deliveries. In addition, exports can significantly increase the revenue side of the country's budget. Today Russia supplies a lot of ammunition abroad. About 50 countries of the world buy our products, in particular the Arab countries, India, Vietnam, Korea and others.
What is the state of the industry today?
- Critical. Of the 150 ammunition enterprises, only 19 factories and one institute (Kazan) remained state-owned, which are now part of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade. Federal state unitary enterprises(FSUE) and science transferred to Rostec. This means that they will be corporatized, that is, they can fall into private hands, become the subject of sale or even speculation. That is, there will be a virtual liquidation of the complex and the destruction of science.
Some enterprises, especially "mechanics" (those that produce cases of shells, bombs), passed into the legal status of LLC. I will give one example. After the privatization of the Vysokogorsky Mechanical Plant, where cases of many types of shells were produced, 40 companies were formed with limited liability who are now selling production area leased for storage space, but they themselves do not produce anything.
As a result of such pseudo-transformations, there was a shortage of capacities for the production of ammunition cases. Only two state-owned factories for the production of explosives remained. If in 1988-1989 we produced two million tons of explosives for civilian industries, such as mining, today the volume is only 230,000 tons.
The power of any army is determined not only by the latest military equipment, but also by the ability to produce modern ammunition. The leadership of the Russian Federation should be concerned about not dressing our army in new form, sewn according to the sketches of famous fashion designers, but by the state of the defense industry, otherwise the army is only suitable for parades. In 1905, we lost to Japan due to lack of ammunition, in 1941, in no small part for the same reason, Hitler approached Moscow. Unfortunately, history teaches nothing.
The experience of the country's development since the time of Peter I shows that ammunition plants should only be state-owned, because government orders are very sensitive to the international situation. A private owner will not be able to maintain capacity without significant costs, he always has problems with loans, interest, profit margins, sales markets and other things that are far from defense tasks. In addition, due to the reduction of state orders for military products in peacetime, the government should take care of locating civilian production at defense enterprises, protect them from possible imports, and provide financial support in their creation and improvement.
I think that in peacetime the volume of state orders for basic products should be no more than 30-40 percent, and the rest of the production volume should be filled with peaceful products. We, veterans of the ammunition industry, are fighting to the best of our ability to preserve its traditions. This is the meaning of the activities of the Regional public organization war and labor veterans of the ammunition industry.
– How do you see the ways out of the crisis and the revival of the defense industry?
- It is necessary to unite under one wing the enterprises of the defense industry complex, which are now spread over many departments, concerns, holdings, associations without clearly defined and unambiguous powers, and, consequently, responsibility. The time has come to create a unified state body for the management of defense enterprises. It could be the revived Ministry of Defense Industry (MOP), which would oversee two main areas - the development, development and production, firstly, of conventional weapons, and secondly, of all types of ammunition, explosives, means of initiation, pyrotechnics, gunpowder, solid propellant.
The duties of the Ministry of Defense should also include conducting research and development on the instructions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, building production facilities, organizing production and fulfilling government orders from the military department and other law enforcement agencies, and laying on it full responsibility for its actions.
As for the ammunition industry, it is necessary to make the federal state-owned enterprises (FKP), now part of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, its basis. Another part of the foundation of the MOP should be the Federal State Unitary Enterprise, now given to Rostec. It is also required to involve in the production of ammunition enterprises located in commercial structures, all these endless OJSCs, LLCs, CJSCs, etc. Their main purpose is to create and maintain mobilization capacities at the expense of budgetary allocations for launching during a threatened period.
The next task is to return research, scientific and production and experimental design organizations to the subordination of the Ministry of Defense Industry, to resume funding for fundamental scientific research on the subject of the defense industry at the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, universities and other scientific and educational institutions. It must be remembered that without the revival of applied and fundamental science, truly breakthrough solutions are impossible.
To eradicate the vicious practice of appointing specialists in financial flows and other incompetent people as heads of factories and research institutes. Of course, pay special attention to personnel. Today, as a result of an almost 20-year break in the influx of young people, there is an acute shortage of specialists. In this regard, in order to ensure a stable supply of highly qualified engineering and scientific personnel for the ammunition and special chemistry industry, training should be fully restored in such universities as the St. Ustinov, Russian Chemical-Technological University. Mendeleev, MSTU im. Bauman, Moscow State University Ecology, Kazan National Research University, Samara State Technological University, Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk Polytechnic Institutes and others.
Training is carried out at the expense of budgetary funds. Upon graduation, a graduate should be sent to work at industrial enterprises, research and production associations, research institutes, design bureaus and other structures of the defense industry for a period of three to five years. To train specialists with secondary technical education and professional workers, restore the work of technical schools and vocational schools.
Now, more than ever, the slogan "Cadres decide everything" is relevant. The loss and non-replenishment of highly qualified personnel means the loss of invaluable practical experience accumulated over decades, since it is not stored in books or on a computer hard drive, but in human memory.
Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU- established in 1954, at the height of the Cold War, occupied one of the leading positions in the system of party and state governing bodies of the country's defense industry complex.
The department in the structure of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU was the working body of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Council of Defense of the USSR on the activities of the defense industries, the creation, production and production of weapons and military equipment for the Armed USSR.
The main functions of the Department were: preparation, organization and control of the implementation of party decisions on equipping the Armed Forces of the country modern systems weapons and military equipment. The Department was also entrusted with the task of implementing the personnel policy of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the defense industries.
AT different years the work of the Department was conducted by the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU: F.R. Kozlov (1960-1963), L.I. Brezhnev (1956-1960 and 1963-1965), D.F. Ustinov (1965-1976) , Ya.P. Ryabov (1976-1979), G.V. Romanov (1983-1985), L.N. Zaikov (1985-1988), O.D. Baklanov (1988-1991).
From 1954 to 1981, the Department was headed by ID Serbin, an experienced leader and major organizer of the military-industrial complex management system. From 1981 to 1985 the head of the Department was I.F. Dmitriev, and from 1985 to 1990 - O.S. Belyakov.
The task of the Department was also to implement the personnel policy in the military-industrial complex. Work in this direction was systematic. The essence of the systematic approach in personnel policy was that it simultaneously covered the selection, training and placement of personnel in party and government bodies management, which together ensured the proper level of efficiency of scientific and production activities of research, design organizations and industrial enterprises.
One of the links in the system was the nomenclature developed by the Central Committee of the CPSU leadership positions, built according to the hierarchical principle:
The nomenclature included:
Award faleristics:
2. Ministry of light industry of the USSR. It was formed for the first time from the People's Commissariat of the same name on March 15, 1946. On December 28, enterprises of the liquidated USSR Ministry of the Textile Industry entered the Ministry. Merged on March 15, 1953 with the Ministry of Food Industry of the USSR, the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry of the USSR, the Ministry of the Fishing Industry of the USSR into one Ministry of Light and Food Industry of the USSR.
Award faleristics:
3. On September 24, 1953, on the basis of light industry enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Light and Food Industry, the USSR Ministry of Industrial Consumer Goods was established.
4. The Ministry of Light Industry of the USSR, was formed for the second time on October 14, 1955, with the division of the Ministry of Industrial Consumer Goods of the USSR. On May 31, 1956, enterprises and organizations of the liquidated USSR Ministry of the Textile Industry entered the ministry. May 10, 1957 abolished. On the basis of the Ministry of Light Industry of the USSR, the State Committee for Light Industry under the State Planning Committee of the USSR was formed.
5. The Ministry of Light Industry of the USSR, formed for the third time on October 2, 1965, abolished on June 27, 1989, on its basis on June 6, 1990, by decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the State Association of Light Industry "Roslegprom" was created.
Award faleristics:
6. The People's Commissariat of the Textile Industry of the USSR was formed on January 2, 1939 by separation from the People's Commissariat of Light Industry. On March 15, 1946, it was transformed into the ministry of the same name.
Award faleristics:
- Honorary textile worker
7. The Ministry of the Textile Industry, formed on March 15, 1946 from the People's Commissariat of the same name. December 28, 1948 merged with the Ministry of Light Industry and liquidated.
7.1. The Ministry of the Textile Industry, for the second time, was formed during the division of the Ministry of Industrial Consumer Goods of the USSR. May 31, 1956 merged with the Ministry of Light Industry and liquidated.
Award faleristics:
- Excellence in Socialist Competition in the Textile Industry
